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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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One-Man Command Is Key Feature of Military Democratization

18010389 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4 Apr 88 pp 4-5

[Article by Col A. Paderin, candidate of historical sciences, and Lt Col R. Sibirtsev, candidate of historical sciences, under the rubric "Towards the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference": "Democratization in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] *Questions of democratization in Soviet society will be the main and central issues at the forthcoming 19th All-Union Party Conference. They also concern the USSR Armed Forces—of one flesh with the people, always living the same life with them, with common interests, concerns and aspirations.*

The practical realization and further development of democratic principles, taking into consideration the specific character of a military organization, is ensured by the combined arms regulations that govern the entire life and activity of the armed forces. They express one of the most important organizational principles in military organizational development, and in the life and activity of the army and naval forces—the principle of one-man command. They make it possible to implement firm and flexible command and control in the best way, to achieve unity of action and efficient organization and discipline, and to maintain a high level of combat readiness of units and ships.

The question could arise: where is the democracy here, if everything in a military collective depends on the fortress of one-man command; is this not a contradiction? There can be only one answer: in terms of our army, one-man command in no way contradicts the democracy of Soviet society. On the contrary, a profound correlation exists between them.

The Soviet one-man-commander is a loyal son of the people, a representative of the party and the state and an executor of their policy in the army and in the navy. He relies in his work on the party organization; he uses its mobilizing force and authority, and the creative activity of communists to increase the combat readiness of units or ships. How ably and consistently he does this in many ways determines the resolution of complex and responsible tasks by military collectives. The activity of progressive officers, for example, of Maj M. Shchukin, who commands an artillery training battery, serves as convincing evidence of this. He provides high quality training of specialists in cooperation with communists.

In turn, party organizations are called upon to strengthen one-man command in every way possible and, with competence in the work, very carefully consider and actively influence all aspects of the life and activity of units and ships. Boldly exposing shortcomings in the training and education of servicemen, communists assist the commander in eliminating their causes.

Today, commanders and chiefs are more and more relying on party organizations in the resolution of personnel problems. In so doing, glasnost is broadened, and the collective opinion of communists is taken into account. The reports of members and candidates for CPSU membership are being listened to attentively more regularly, and discussions and approvals of party character references at meetings at which the political, professional and ethical qualities of servicemen are evaluated are becoming customary. It is this kind of an approach that is practiced in the activity of the party bureau of a unit headed by Maj G. Krivonos. It is not accidental here that the right to promotion is conferred only on servicemen who are ideologically mature, morally above reproach and highly qualified.

It is the actual consistent conduct of democratic principles in inner party life and an increasingly fuller realization by communists of the rights and duties defined by Rules of the CPSU that constitute the most important directions of democratization in military units. The process of renewal in Komsomol and trade union organization and work in the organs of national control, the comrades' courts and the women's councils depends on the extent to which party members act energetically. Their significance is growing noticeably. This is a good sign of the expansion of democracy in the Armed Forces.

Life also requires that there be a positive increase in the role of such social institutions of the army and navy as the general assembly of personnel and various categories of servicemen, their election of soviets, and officer conferences. All of them are capable of giving more effective help to commanders and political workers in the fight to increase the quality of combat and political training of soldiers. Here is a typical example. In the subunit commanded by Warrant Officer Yu. Toma, general assemblies of personnel working together openly began to determine places in socialist competition. Of course, the final word, as previously, remained with the commander. But this innovation noticeably increased the service and social activity of the servicemen: they understood that their word was being heeded.

We will not conceal the fact that democratization in the army and the navy is having a hard time. Habit and old methods of management, passivity and complacency toward social matters are having an effect. Not everyone by far clearly conceives a way of developing democracy under army conditions. To live and function in a new way and democratically, everyone has to learn: from the commander to the private. What is necessary for this?

The most important condition for expanding democracy, as is known, is glasnost. It demands an open discussion of problems and decisions. Without glasnost, it was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, there can be no political creativity of the masses, their interest in social matters, and in the open and principled struggle against negative phenomena. In the army and the navy

this means giving soldiers a greater opportunity systematically to receive information on the state of affairs in a military collective and to actively participate in the resolution of urgent questions of combat training and service. In doing this, it is very important that the opinion of the army and navy community be elaborated openly, and not in the course of lobbying conversations. But this, unfortunately, has not been gotten rid of yet. Even in such a particularly democratic matter as the promotion of candidates to deputy in the Soviet of People's Deputies. For example, in the Kachinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni A. F. Myasnikov, public opinion was not properly taken into account. As a result, one of the candidates was not given a vote of confidence at one of the general assemblies of personnel.

The essence of glasnost is that in each military collective everyone knows who is worth what, who is making a contribution to the common cause, and who achieved successes in what or is committing errors. Of course, glasnost does not denote unlimited information for servicemen: the requirement for not publicizing military secrets remains unchanged,

Democracy cannot develop outside an atmosphere of principled comradely criticism and self-criticism. This is why the ability to use this critical and powerful means of social democracy is necessary to each member of a military collective. Under conditions of restructuring, criticism is more distinctly displaying its favorable influence on overcoming errors and shortcomings and in increasing responsibility for the fulfillment of one's service duties. In the army and navy, only the orders of the commanders and chiefs are not subject to criticism, which is stipulated by the specific nature of a military organization and the character of the tasks to be performed by units and ships.

A genuine, and not cosmetic, closeness of commanders and chiefs to subordinates is an indispensable condition of democracy in army life. Thus, Maj Ye. Baturin, commander of a tank battalion, combines a high level of exactingness, principle, and implacability to shortcomings with trust in and respect for people, and constant concern for them, and he does not permit rudeness and belittling their personal dignity. The soldiers also trust and respect him. And this inspires their activity in the service, in social matters and interest in their common success.

The battalion commander understands that soldiers just starting their service require the greatest attention and sensitivity. He tries to do everything so that, from the very first days of their arrival in the subunit, the young soldiers feel that they are part of a large family, where the spirit of fraternal friendship and mutual support reigns. The concern and counsel of a knowledgeable comrade and his encouraging word are very dear to an 18-year-old!

The affirmation and development of democratic principles in the life of a military collective takes place successfully where the commander or the chief, not in words but in deeds, fights for the restructuring of political education work and personally participates in it, and where this is required of all officers.

The democratization of army and navy life is a comprehensive and multiprogram process. More and more the broad masses of soldiers are drawn into it. This is helped by an atmosphere that is being firmly established in our society of creative enthusiasm, a rejection of old approaches and habits, a firm belief in civic maturity and in the intellect and energy of the Soviet individual—creator and defender of socialism.

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General Chervov on 'Reasonable Sufficiency'

AU0507110488 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 2 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov:
"On the Military Doctrines of East and West; In the
Interest of Strategic Stability"]

[Text] In the West, they continue to distort the essence of Soviet military doctrine. They ascribe an aggressive character to it. They assert that the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces has not been substantiated by facts thus far.

And what is the reality?

Let us recall, above all, the fact that the main thesis of our military doctrine is to prevent war. In this way the thesis on preventing war is, for the first time, an integral part of our military doctrine. Naturally, the Warsaw Pact's military activity has envisaged the struggle against war before. This has become the primary task now.

Why? Above all, because a nuclear war in a nuclear century would have catastrophic consequences for both sides. War can no longer be a instrument for achieving political objectives nowadays.

We would be glad if the NATO countries would also declare, just as we have done, that the objective of all their intentions and activity is not to permit war—be it nuclear or conventional war.

The most important characteristic of the Warsaw Pact doctrine is its defensive nature. This is demonstrated, first, by the fact that we have never linked our future with a military solution of international problems.

And second, the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are waiting for the United States and NATO to assume the same commitment.

We do not regard any nation as our enemy. We are prepared to build relations with all countries on the foundation of peaceful coexistence and of mutually taking interests and security into account.

When resolving defensive tasks, we proceed from the principle of retaliatory actions. All our defensive measures are aimed against the threat of war that the U.S. and NATO armed forces pose.

In the buildup of our military forces we adhere to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. What do we understand by this term? This is a state of the country's defense-capability and of its armed forces that ensures the reliable defense of the state (of an alliance of states) against aggression with the minimum of armed forces.

Defensive sufficiency presupposes:

—the mutual commitment that countries will not be the first to launch a war;

—maintaining an equilibrium in the combat structure and in the potential of the USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons;

—reducing armed forces and conventional weapons to the level at which neither of the sides, while ensuring a reliable defense, is able to launch offensive actions;

—harmonizing the structures of armed forces, groupings, and deployment with defensive tasks;

—strict monitoring of the reduction of armed forces and weapons, as well as the monitoring of the two countries' military actions.

Unilateral implementation of defensive sufficiency is practically impossible. Sufficiency is determined by the nature of the military threat. Therefore, the implementation of the principle of sufficiency is a mutual, bilateral process.

In our view, the U.S. and NATO effort to strengthen their security was not coordinated with other countries, but it is to their detriment, and we can see how they are ensuring their military superiority by continuing feverish arms buildup.

I will present some facts: The plans to "compensate" for the Pershing-2's and cruise missiles that have been eliminated (increasing the number of the F-111 aircraft, of cruise missiles to 1,400, enhancing the French and British nuclear potential); the non-assumption of the commitment that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; the holding of extensive military exercises near the socialist countries' borders, which can be distinguished only with difficulty from the real deployment of troops for waging war.

The NATO concept of "nuclear intimidation" also has nothing in common with defense. No one has yet proved, and cannot prove, that if there were not any nuclear weapons, World War III would be inevitable.

Even though up to now World War III has not broken out, today no one can guarantee that this will not happen in the future and nuclear weapons will not be used, all the more so since the United States and NATO do not exclude the possibility of being the first to use them. Can we reconcile ourselves to any, even the tiniest, degree of probability of mankind's self-destruction?

The ongoing changes in the world elicit the need to expand the mutual understanding and cooperation between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO regarding military activity. In

their everyday military activity, the Warsaw Pact countries definitely wish to abide by the doctrine and principle of defensive sufficiency. This is our contribution to the strengthening of international security.

Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle

*18010356 Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian
No 3, Mar 88 pp 18-21*

[Article by Col G. Ionin, candidate of military sciences, docent: "Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle"]

[Text] Soviet military doctrine, as is known, is thoroughly defensive in nature. This means that we will not begin military operations if we are not subjected to armed attack. If the imperialists unleash war, we will be forced from its very outset to repulse the invasion of the aggressor, and only after this will transition to a decisive offensive. This is the reason for the great attention that is being paid to defense in the theory of military art, as well as in the practice of military training of the forces.

In the article I wish to discuss only the foundations of defensive battle: to examine its essence and place in combined arms battle; the conditions under which troops shift to the defense and the demands placed upon it; the combat formation; structure of the defensive area; and system of fire.

The defense arose simultaneously with the offense. It developed primarily as a result of improvement in weapons and military equipment. Their influence on the nature and methods of defensive operations was manifested not only directly, but also through the changing methods of the enemy offensive. In particular, the use of new means of combat by defending forces increases their combat capabilities, gives the defense new characteristics and makes it more stable and active. But the attacking enemy also uses new types of weapons and military equipment. His firepower and the strength of his strike are increasing, primarily as a result of weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional high-precision weapons, which include weapons systems that employ guided (adjustable) and self-guided munitions capable of destroying targets with the first round. Consequently, even higher demands are placed upon the defense.

The essence and place of the defense in combined arms battle. Today it is able not only to repulse an offensive by superior enemy forces, inflict substantial losses upon him, and thereby create favorable conditions for the shift to the offense, but also to break an offensive being prepared by the enemy.

In the defense the forces most often will engage in combat against significantly superior forces. Thus, in the Battle of Moscow in the Fall of 1941, on the Tula-Kashira Axis the enemy had an eight-fold superiority in tanks and three-fold superiority in artillery. And now the commands of the armies in the major capitalist states anticipate creating four to six-fold superiority on the

main axes to achieve success in the offensive. It goes without saying that with such an unfavorable correlation of personnel and equipment one cannot count upon defeating the opposing grouping. Even to repulse an offensive in such a situation is a very, very complex matter. However, it is fully realizable if the strong aspects of the defense, which consists of the following, are correctly carried out.

First, the defenders can use more effectively than the attackers the protective characteristics of the terrain and its engineer preparation. Even the simplest foxholes reduce the vulnerability of troops to nuclear weapons (and consequently losses) approximately three-fold, and losses from conventional weapons that fire from concealed positions by seven or more times over.

Second, in the defense both nuclear and conventional weapons possess great capabilities. Thus, the area of destruction of personnel in the open by nuclear weapons is three times greater than that of covered personnel.

During the war years it was sufficient to bring in three artillery battalions and expend 0.3-0.4 units of fire for reliable suppression of a battalion attacking on foot (to force it to go to ground and inflict 20-30 percent casualties). And in order to suppress such a subunit located in the defense (force him to halt his firing and also inflict upon him 25-30 percent losses), no fewer than 9 artillery battalions expending an entire unit of fire were required.

Third, defenders combating enemy tanks and armored infantry can make extensive use of minefields, while the capabilities of the attackers, even taking into account remote mining, are limited.

Fourth, the defenders can select the place for the battle, and advantageous areas and lines, accomplish camouflage more reliably than the attackers, conceal true and demonstrate false intentions, prepare maneuver in advance, etc.

Consequently, the essence of the defense consists of repulsing an offensive by superior enemy forces through inflicting defeat upon him by airstrikes and fire from all weapons, in combination with broad maneuver and counterattacks, while simultaneously holding important terrain areas and thereby creating favorable conditions for a transition to the offensive.

It stems from this that total destruction of an opposing enemy grouping cannot be achieved through defensive operations. They can only create favorable conditions for his destruction, again, through the offensive. The defense, therefore, is rightfully considered a type of combined arms battle, subordinate to the interests of the offense. It is usually resorted to either compulsorily (where offense is impossible), or intentionally (where it is inadvisable).

Conditions for the shift to the defense and the requirements placed upon it. Conditions for shifting to the defense are usually understood as the specific tactical situation in which its preparation will be carried out, including the shift to the defense itself. Of the components of the situation, decisive influence on the content of the conditions is rendered by the enemy position and nature of his actions. Depending on this and on the mission received, the defense may be prepared, and the forces shift to it in advance (including in peacetime to cover border areas and repulse a possible enemy attack), or in the course of battle (the conduct of military operations), under conditions of direct contact with the enemy or outside of such contact.

Preparation of the defense in peacetime consists of carrying out measures aimed at repulsing the enemy incursion, including making the decision, issuing missions to subunits, organization of fire destruction of the enemy and types of support, etc. With the start of combat operations the situation may change sharply, and accordingly it will be necessary to clarify previously taken preparatory measures, and sometimes even to make a new decision. That is, as a rule the situation will not be an easy one.

During the years of the past war the enemy everywhere tried to disrupt our preparations for the defense. For this purpose he inflicted destruction on troops shifting to the defense, creating centers of combat operations in the rear, and attempted to seize lines that provided a favorable situation for developing the offensive. Under modern conditions the opposition will be still more active.

It is much more difficult to shift to the defense from direct contact with the enemy. During the Great Patriotic War this was necessary during the course of a general offensive by our forces to repulse counterattacks from superior Fascist forces, fortify seized areas, support the flanks of the attackers, as well as upon an unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engagement. The units and subunits shifting to the defense, as a rule, were subjected to active opposition from the attackers. Today this opposition may be strikes by weapons of mass destruction, conventional high-precision weapons, continuous attacks, remote mining, and in coastal sectors, also active operations by naval forces. Shifting to the defense, forces will be required simultaneously to eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear and chemical strikes, repulse his attacks and clear the terrain of mines. The need may arise to fight to improve the position occupied, as well as to combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups in our rear.

Outside of contact with the enemy, the forces shifted to the defense during the course of combat operations in places where our offensive was not anticipated for a number of reasons (on secondary axes, or axes of difficult accessibility), as well as on the seacoast and islands to repulse possible enemy amphibious landings. In such instances favorable conditions appear for careful study

of the terrain in the depth and on the approaches to the forward edge, for selecting the most advantageous defensive lines and areas, structuring the combat formation, organizing fire and maneuver, and making extensive use of engineer equipment, not only in depth, but also on the forward edge of the defense.

It should be remembered, however, that today the attackers have effective and long range weapons, especially reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike systems, and means of remote mining, which are capable of complicating the shift to the defense even outside of contact with the enemy. This requires knowledge of all the conditions for shifting to the defense, and of the procedure for the work of the commander in organizing this transition, and that it be accomplished in secrecy and in the minimum time.

In no matter what conditions the forces shift to the defense, it must always meet the requirements placed upon it, mainly: to be stable and active; able to repulse enemy strikes using all types of weapons; to withstand strikes of nuclear and chemical weapons, aviation and artillery, and massive attacks by tanks and other armored combat vehicles. It must be capable of waging an active battle against them, not permitting the landing of air assaults and air mobile groups, and in case of an enemy penetration, to destroy it. Only then will the defense achieve the goals assigned to it.

Combat formation.[Boyevoy poryadok] Units and subunits are assigned sectors and areas (strongpoints) respectively for the defense, within which they deploy into combat formation.

Depending on the mission assigned and the specific situation, it may be structured either in two or in one echelon. According to the experience of the past war, the two echelon formation turned out to be most acceptable. It should be emphasized, however, that in defending on less important axes, when there are substantial losses, and in other instances, the battalion combat formation can also be structured in one echelon.

Maj Yu. Veselovskiy, a motorized rifle battalion commander, approached this question creatively in an exercise. During the course of a day his subordinates twice shifted to the defense. The first time it was necessary to repulse the attack of a superior "enemy," and the officer decided to structure the battalion combat formation in two echelons. This made it possible to build up fire gradually, maneuver forces and resources, and take part in the counterattack carried out by the regiment second echelon.

In the other case the battalion was defending on a secondary axis of the "enemy" offensive, on difficult terrain, after having suffered losses. Now the battalion commander structured the combat formation in one echelon. But in order to prevent a significant reduction in the depth of the defense, and have the capability to

organize flanking and intersecting fire, he moved one company forward. The officer ably used the camouflaging characteristics of the terrain, and periodically changed positions, employing maneuver by elements of the combat formation that were in the depth of the defense, and succeeded in confusing the enemy.

Structure of the defensive area. Battalions occupy the defense within a single position. It is based on company strongpoints prepared for parameter defense and combined into battalion areas. The company strongpoints are created so as to intercept the most probable axes of the enemy offensive, not only through their fire, but also by their disposition on the terrain. According to the experience of the past war, the fascists frequently succeeded in suppressing the strongpoints and breaking through unimpeded into the depth of the defense. The battle was more difficult for the attacker when such points barred his path.

Experienced commanders strive to select each defensive position, and consequently also the forward edge of the defense, behind water obstacles, swamps, ravines, and other natural obstacles. Stubborn resistance by the defenders on such lines reduces the rate of the enemy advance and makes it possible to destroy him by fire effectively for a long period of time.

The high mobility of defending forces stipulated the creation of fire lines assigned to tank subunits, as well as motorized rifle subunits on BMPs, located in second echelons. They may be prepared both in the battalion defensive area, and outside of it on probable axes of mass attacks by enemy tanks and armored fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). Trenches for tanks and BMPs, as well as routes of movement to them, are prepared on the fire lines. In places where an enemy penetration into the defense is possible, second echelon (reserve) subunits are given lines of deployment for counterattacks. When time is available they can be prepared in an engineer respect.

The stability of the defense is significantly improved when switch positions are prepared within and between battalion areas. They are structured at an angle to the front, in order to prevent the expansion of an enemy breakthrough toward the flanks, and to make it possible to create fire sacks to destroy him by fire and counterattacks. It is difficult to overestimate the role of ambushes in the defense, carried out by tank and ATGM subunits and other anti-tank weapons. Their positions may be prepared throughout the depth of the defense, especially in the gaps between the strongpoints. Small subunits placed in ambush may quickly change positions, and by surprise fire inflict significant losses on enemy tanks and fighting vehicles (personnel carriers) that have broken through.

System of fire. The strength of the defense is in its fire. But the capabilities of fire weapons can be used fully only when they are employed purposefully, and in coordination by target, place and time; i.e., when they are organized into a

system of fire. A single system of fire of all types—artillery (from concealed fire positions), anti-tank, and small arms—is created in combined arms units and subunits.

A system of fire is the aggregate of fire of all types of fire weapons disposed according to the commander's decision, which provides for its organized deployment for the purpose of inflicting maximum destruction on the enemy. It includes sectors of concentrated and lines of defensive artillery fire, prepared on the approaches to the defense, in front of the forward edge, on the flanks and in its depth; areas of anti-tank fire and massed, multi-layered fire from all types of weapons in front of the forward edge, in the gaps, on the flanks and in the depth of the defense; and prepared maneuver by fire for the purpose of achieving its rapid concentration on any threatened axis or sector.

An important role is allotted to **anti-tank fire**, since tanks and other armored combat vehicles comprise the basis of enemy offensive groupings, and its results largely predetermine the achievement of the goal of the defense.

Anti-tank fire is organized fire by tanks, BMPs, ATGMs, guns, especially anti-tank guns, and grenade launchers, which they conduct by direct fire. Its distant boundary may be at a depth of several kilometers, and be supported by fire from ATGMs, BMPs, tanks and other weapons. Tanks, BMPs (BTRs), ATGMs, and guns are disposed in strongpoints and defensive areas in secrecy and are dispersed, taking into account the requirements of protection against nuclear and conventional weapons, and so that they can conduct fire to maximum distances, destroy the enemy by flanking, intersecting and surprise short-range concentrated fire of high density, have mutual coordination with fire, and create fire sacks.

The fire system must be coordinated with planned nuclear strikes and be combined with the system of engineer obstacles.

Such are the most important postulates of the foundations of modern defensive combat, by which combined arms commanders and staffs must be guided in preparing the defense and controlling their subordinate subunits during its conduct.

From the editors. With the article by Col G. Ionin, the editors begin publication of materials on problems of defensive combat. In this regard, the editorial collegium requests that unit and subunit commanders, staff officers, instructors at military academies and schools, chiefs of branches of arms and services, and all journal readers express their opinion, especially on such questions as the organization of defensive combat at the battalion, company, and platoon levels.

Problems of creation of the combat formation and organization of the system of fire, engineer preparation of merit attention and require detailed discussion. It is worthwhile to discuss separately military stratagem and deceptive actions, methods of achieving surprise in defensive combat, etc.

**Radar Subunit's Combat Readiness Jeopardized
by Spare Parts Shortage**

18010367a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 88 2d ed p 1

[Article by Capt V. Amirov, Troops of Air Defense: "The Price of Reliability"]

[Text] Warrant Officer N. Shchelkonogov reported to Maj A. Sazonov, radar company commander, that an altimeter had gone out of commission: the induction coils had burned out. The matter of replacing the coils arose, and there turned out not to be any operable ones in the subunit depot. Nor were they found in the radar battalion depot.

The needed parts were found only in the unit. A courier was sent there on a train. The overall downtime of the altimeter was several days.

For radar operators, is it not strange, this sad incident is an ordinary everyday situation. Yes, at times equipment breaks down and stands idle. The commanders, it is true, attempt somehow to manipulate existing forces and resources. However, no matter how they manipulate, there is one known truth: There are no extra stations or altimeters in a subunit or unit. Combat readiness depends on the reliability of each technical entity without exception.

Specialists know that the most modern radar system "has the right" to go out of action. Parts, assemblies and sets wear out, and this results, in the final analysis, in interruptions in the operation of the apparatus. So that this does not take place, it is necessary to find the dubious parts in a timely manner, and replace them with new and reliable ones. It is all seemingly simple. In theory! In practice, it is often very difficult, and at times impossible, to obtain parts.

Maj Sazonov repeatedly requested of the battalion and regiment command that the ZIPs [kits of spare parts and assemblies] of the radar stations be completed. No measures were taken, although they are responsible for combat readiness.

In the words of Maj V. Andrianov, an officer at battalion headquarters, the company commanded by Maj Sazonov gets into difficult situations because the commander does not compile lists of shortages in his ZIPs in a timely manner. But the main reason is the spare parts shortage. I even heard this in the unit headquarters. What is the solution seen for this? They still merely cite the poor overall spare parts support. But, you see, it is necessary, as we say, to knock on all the doors. In and of itself, nothing is solved. The regiment command must go to those same departments that are directly involved in the material and technical support of radars. Moreover, the supply of parts can be supplemented from an apparatus that has been written off. It is true that it is first necessary to remove the existing obstacles.

One day Sr Lt A. Drozhilkin asked the unit armaments service to allow him to remove operable parts from a written off electrical rack. He did not receive permission. And after a time he saw the rack smashed at the dump.

The problem of creating a supply of parts is urgent not only for the subunits commanded by Maj Sazonov. And it is necessary to solve it without delay. It is necessary to solve it specifically and completely. Meanwhile, the unit command and subunit commanders seek some doubtful ways out, and drive the ancient "sickness" deep. Judging by everything, obsolete criteria for evaluating the condition of equipment also helps in this. Its reliability is evaluated according to two main parameters: overall idle time, and average repair time. While the first criterion encourages commanders to struggle to reduce idle time, the second encourages them to be arbitrary with repair times, and, if there is a lack of control, even to commit deception. The idle time of several days for this altimeter can be substantially "compensated for" by making up several imaginary troubles, which will be reported to headquarters. The average monthly time required to repair equipment thus turns out to be acceptable in the reporting documents. In fact, the equipment will stand idle for a much longer time. Needless to say, this reduces the level of combat readiness.

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Mighty Factor for World Peace

18120076b Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in
English No 3, Mar 88 pp 9-15, 55

[Article by Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, chief of a Department, General Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR]

[Text] Seventy years have passed since the Armed Forces of the USSR were organized. They were formed by the Communist Party, by Lenin, shortly after the founding of the world's first socialist state, as an instrument for defending the revolutionary achievements of the people. "This army," Lenin wrote, "is called upon to safeguard the gains of the revolution and our people's power, the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the whole of this new and truly democratic system, against the attacks of all the enemies of the people, who are bending all efforts to destroy the revolution." (Footnote 1) (V. I. Lenin, "Collected Works," Vol. 26, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 420)

Following the victory of the October Revolution, for as long as the class struggle in our country continued, our army had to perform an internal function for a time by defending the people's revolutionary achievements against the plots of the overthrown exploiter classes and by suppressing their armed actions.

With the triumph of socialism and the formation of a state of the whole people the internal function of the army ceased. From the standpoint of the country's internal conditions our society does not need an army. It

is noteworthy that none but the army of a socialist state loses its internal function at a definite stage in its development. Objectively, no bourgeois army can undergo this kind of evolution, for the ruling class of a society rent by class antagonisms always needs a military force as a means of putting down the people's revolutionary movement. The only functions of the Soviet Armed Forces today is external.

The historical mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is to reliably defend the country of the October Revolution and developed socialist society against the aggressive schemes of imperialism and its accomplices, and ensure favourable external conditions for communist construction.

The Soviet delegation led by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, vigorously worked during its official visit to Washington from December 7 to 10, 1987, to promote disarmament, remove the nuclear menace and relax tensions and lessen confrontation in the world. Why were these problems given so much attention? Aren't we much stronger than, say, 15 or 20 years ago? Aren't the peace forces superior to the forces of war? And then don't the imperialists have an idea of what nuclear war is like?

Yes, our country is far stronger than at any time in the past. There exists world socialism—a powerful international formation backed by a highly developed economy, solid scientific facilities and a dependable military-political potential. The Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist community countries are not inferior in strength to the armies of the main imperialist powers. Our country has many allies and supporters abroad, many partners in the struggle for peace, freedom and progress. The 27th Congress of our party came to the conclusion that nuclear war can be staved off. "The CPSU," we read in the party Programme, "proceeds from the belief that, however grave the threat to peace posed by the policy of the aggressive circles of imperialism, world war is not fatally inevitable. It is possible to avert war and to save mankind from catastrophe. This is the historical mission of socialism, of all the progressive and peace-loving forces of the world." (Footnote 2) ("Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 23)

But we are realists. The socialist world, a world looking ahead, is faced with a strong and dangerous capitalist world. Capitalism's general crisis is deepening, the sphere of its domination is shrinking irresistibly and the policy of its reactionary forces remains hostile to the peoples' interests. Imperialism is bitterly resisting social progress, trying to stop or even to reverse the course of history, to undermine the positions of socialism and take social revenge on it at world level. By virtue of its social nature, it is constantly generating a reckless policy of aggression. "The roots of war lie in the very essence of capitalism," Lenin pointed out. The record of today's

US administration includes acts of aggression such as the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of Lebanon, the aggression against Libya, the undeclared wars against the peoples of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique.

The threat of nuclear war persists. While there are encouraging signs of a healthier situation in the world, the policy of bellicose imperialist forces willing to further their selfish interests by sacrificing the destinies of whole nations threatens the use of nuclear weapons. This is fraught with a global nuclear cataclysm in which there would be neither victors nor vanquished, and all life could be destroyed.

The bellicose policy of US imperialism finds clear expression in America's military doctrine, in the arms race being escalated by the US imperialists, in their bid to deploy weapons in space, to upset in their favour the military strategic parity existing today, to control world developments.

The US military doctrine of the 1980s openly declares that it is aimed at achieving "complete and unquestioned military superiority for the United States", "restoring America's leading role in the world" and "actively resisting the Soviet Union in every part of the globe". These official guidelines, which are being enforced under cover of the myth of the "Soviet military threat", serve as a political rationale for the arms race and fully suit American reactionaries and the US military-industrial complex, which makes bigger profits than any other sphere of material production.

The offensive character of the US military doctrine expresses itself in the building of the country's armed forces, in which emphasis is placed on 27-APR-87preparations for a strategic (world) nuclear war. The United States assigns the chief role in attaining its objectives in such a war to its strategic offensive forces, which include over 2,200 delivery vehicles with a lift capacity of more than 14,000 pieces of nuclear ammunition at one launch. The buildup of these forces is continuing. The Pentagon is adding the most dangerous and destabilising weapons to its armoury: MX ICBMs tipped with 10 warheads each and many hundreds of long-range sea-based cruise missiles. Besides, it is going to test Trident-2 SLBMs equipped with 12 warheads.

The Pentagon is now concentrating on ensuring that in the event of war it can neutralise Soviet retaliation. To this end it is carrying out the Star Wars (SDI) programme, that is, setting up a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system on earth and in space guaranteeing the destruction of enemy missiles. In other words, it wants to create a "reliable shield" and an "irresistible sword". Were the idea of this ABM system to materialise, it would tempt lovers of armed adventure to risk "pushing the button" in the hope of getting away with it, since the "reliable shield" (or space strike weapons) is intended to destroy in space the Soviet missiles

which survive an American nuclear first strike. By way of preparing to wage a "preventive war", the Pentagon is studying the possibility of developing a nuclear bomb with reinforced electromagnetic impulse. Its experts estimate that if exploded over Soviet territory, such a bomb could knock out the country's entire communications system.

Both the projected "anti-missile solution" and the development of a new nuclear bomb with reinforced electromagnetic impulse pursue the one aim of making it possible for the United States to deliver a nuclear first strike with impunity and to prevent the Soviet Union from retaliating; in other words, the idea is to disarm our country in the face of the US nuclear menace. This is the true purpose of the Star Wars programme.

The Soviet leadership holds that in this nuclear and space age no one can benefit politically from either the arms race or the aspiration for military superiority. Reciprocal security should be based on lowering the level of military confrontation and on reducing and ultimately eliminating all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The military potentials of nations should be reduced to limits sufficient solely for defence.

Why do we approach the problem in this way? Because the arms race has reached a stage where weapons, no matter how powerful or numerous, can no longer be used for attaining political ends; still less can they be used in the foreseeable future. The old notion of war as a means of achieving political objectives has had its day. With due regard to this reality, the Soviet Union is doing all that is needed to help ease confrontation, start real disarmament and advance towards a safe world with armaments at the lowest level. It backs up its proposals to this end with practical deeds.

We carried out no nuclear tests for eighteen months while the United States stepped up its nuclear blasts in Nevada. The Soviet Union is ready even now to suspend nuclear testing any day on a reciprocal basis. Not so with the United States. We propose coming to terms on a substantial reduction of the power of nuclear blasts and a drastic cut in their number. But the United States refuses to meet us half-way on this proposal as well.

The Soviet Union has made compromises on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles: we are eliminating more missiles and warheads for them than the United States (of course, under the IRMs-SRMs Treaty, the USA has made certain compromises too); we have agreed to discount the nuclear missiles of Britain and France; and we have put off decision on intermediate-range aircraft nuclear weapons. Thanks to the Soviet Union's initiative, a treaty has been signed for the first time in history on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons: IRMs and SRMs. This treaty is important from the military as well as from the moral and political points of

view. It paves the way for new and farther-reaching accords, and can lead international relations out of the vicious circle of outdated thinking, suspiciousness and distrust.

Of particular importance in this connection is the solution of the problem of a tangible cut in strategic offensive weapons (SOW). The Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement reflects the agreement of principle of both sides to cut their SOW by 50 per cent, given the ABM Treaty is observed as signed in 1972.

What progress has been made at the Washington summit in the SOW problem? While in Reykjavik the parties agreed to reduce the strategic offensive weapons of the two countries to the levels not exceeding 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads on them and reached accords on the limitations on heavy missiles, on the rule of account for heavy bombers, the Washington meeting supplemented the above accords with new provisions.

The USSR and the USA leaders agreed to introduce the ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total. They specified the sub-levels for heavy missiles (1,540 warheads and 154 heavy missiles). It was a compromise on the part of the Soviet Union meeting the US interests half-way.

The parties also agreed that it was necessary to elaborate an accord which, as was indicated in the joint statement, would make it binding on the Soviet and American sides to comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, which also covered research, development and, if necessary, tests allowed by it, and not to withdraw from the treaty within a specified period of time. The joint statement also says that if the USSR and the USA fail to come to an agreement by the time the specified period of the non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty expires, each side will be free to decide its course of action.

Another step forward has been made in the problem of limiting the deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. The USA had to agree to establish ceilings for such missiles (besides 6,000 warheads) and search jointly with the Soviet side, for mutually acceptable methods of verification of such limitations. This is a substantial concession of the American side to the Soviet Union. Until then the United States flatly refused to impose limitations on the sea-launched cruise missiles.

As the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, persevering and purposeful efforts by the Soviet delegation in Washington resulted in considerable progress on the problem of a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the context of preserving and strictly respecting the ABM Treaty. This problem remains central to Soviet-US relations. And the Soviet Union considers it feasible to draft a relevant treaty, to

be signed in Moscow during the US President's reciprocal visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of this year. (Footnote 3) (PRAVDA, Dec. 18, 1987)

Now some politicians in the United States attempt to interpret in their own way the essence of the Joint Soviet-US Statement claiming that the elaboration of accords on strategic offensive weapons can be carried out without linking it to the problems of anti-missile defence and that the Washington summit has removed all disagreements on the SDI. Consequently, they say, the United States can accelerate the implementation of this programme. All this does not contribute to a constructive dialogue on strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Union believes that in this field the parties should not lose time, and act constructively making progress in the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the accords reached by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington.

One of the priority problems, along with that of nuclear armaments, is the problem of banning and destroying all chemical weapons under strict international control. In November-December 1987, another round of multilateral negotiations and Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons was held in Geneva. The USA has claimed for a long time that successful talks were impeded by the Soviet Union's unpreparedness to consolidate mutual trust by exchanging information on chemical weapons. The Soviet side took major steps to meet the US side half-way by proposing to effect the first stage of exchanging data on chemical weapons and on the facilities for their production as early as the closing stage of the talks—to inform each other of the available reserves, the number and location of the facilities for the production and storing of chemical weapons—and to effect the second stage, prior to the signing of a convention, by supplying still more detailed information (the composition of chemical weapons in every depot, production capacities, the characteristics of the facilities to be used for destroying chemical weapons; disclosing the laboratories, testing-grounds, and so on).

We confirmed our invitation to visit the facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the area of Chapayevsk after it has been built, that is, in 1988 as planned.

We note with satisfaction that the reserve of confidence between the parties to the talks is growing. In October 1987, we demonstrated at the Shikhany military installation standard models of chemical ammunition of the Soviet Army and the technology of destroying them, using a mobile complex for the purpose. In November our experts visited, on invitation, US and West German facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons at Tooele (Utah) and Muenster, respectively.

One would have expected the talks on banning chemical weapons to move fast to a close. But the nearer the finish, the more numerous the obstacles and the attempts to drag out the talks, to get away from a comprehensive

prohibition of chemical weapons. Voices are now raised in favour of regulating chemical armaments and not of banning them, of partial measures instead of a global solution. The US delegate said so outright in the First (Political) Committee of the UN General Assembly.

The problem at the moment is to write into the future convention provisions ruling out any revival of a military chemical potential anywhere. It is precisely on this point that the United States is trying to secure unilateral advantages. It intends to keep its facilities for the development and production of chemical weapons by leaving intact laboratories, commercial chemical enterprises and transnational corporations. That is evidently why the USA insists on a dissimilar approach to control exercised over state and private sectors of science and economy of the states parties to the convention. According to this approach in the case of the Soviet Union all facilities—even those having no relation to chemical weapons—should be involved while in the case of the United States the majority of private chemical enterprises and transnationals, including their subsidiaries outside US territory, would be exempt from control.

What would that cover? Everything in the case of the Soviet Union and hardly anything in that of the United States and other NATO countries. So where does an equal approach come in? What kind of partnership would that be? The Soviet Union proceeds from the necessity of making legally binding on-site inspections on request regardless of the forms of property of the participating states. Thus, the Soviet Union believes that the problem of verification has been settled irrevocably.

The answer to the question why the talks are marking time lies evidently in the military sphere. The United States, far from preparing to eliminate chemical weapons, has launched the programme for the production of new lethal arms known as binary weapons. The political impact of this programme on talks is definitely negative, to say nothing of its militarist essence, which was emphasized by the Statement of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 26, 1987. Besides, it sets a bad example for countries still lacking chemical weapons, which may lead to the latter's proliferation. It is fair to ask: In what way do all these moves of Washington square with its official statements about the United States seeking an effective global ban on chemical weapons?

At this crucial stage in the drafting of a convention on eliminating chemical weapons, we cannot help being surprised at the attitude of some other parties, such as France, to the Geneva talks. The proposals concerning a so-called "security reserve" submitted by that country in the summer of 1987 militate against the objectives of the convention being drafted, for they envisage the possibility of producing these weapons even after the convention comes into force.

In accordance with the Soviet-US statement adopted at the Washington summit, it is now important that the Soviet Union and United States take a common stand on the adoption of the requisite measures at the Disarmament Conference with a view to successfully completing the drafting of a convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons by the time the 3rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament opens (May 1988). Other parties to the talks should likewise contribute their share to the attainment of this lofty goal. As for the Soviet Union, it is willing to do all in its power to this end.

The Soviet Union assigns a special place in its practical moves to Europe, a region where the two alliances have major armed forces directly facing each other, and where two world wars broke out. In June 1986, with a view to lowering the level of military confrontation, the WTO countries proposed talks on cuts in armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals). Now that the treaty on eliminating IRMs-SRMs has been signed, the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, along with cuts in SOWs, is coming to the fore in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the WTO and NATO.

Why do we think so? First, because confrontation in Europe is dangerous. Second, because the buildup of a non-nuclear destruction potential continues unabated, with this potential gaining in speed and range in the same way as the destructive consequences of conventional war, which is increasingly comparable to nuclear war due to the impossibility of limiting it, to its intensity, the likely casualties and the impossibility of winning it. There is reason to believe that a hypothetical war using conventional forces only would be disastrous to Europe in view of the density of its population and the existence of about 200 atomic power stations and numerous chemical enterprises. All this objectively makes future European talks more pressing.

The balance of the armed forces and armaments of NATO and WTO makes it possible to set out reducing military confrontation in Europe on an equal basis and without detriment to each other's security.

Guided by their Budapest Appeal, the Warsaw Treaty countries propose: to begin with, one reciprocal reduction of the strength of the NATO and WTO troops from 100,000 to 150,000 on each side, to be accomplished in one or two years; in the early 1990s, a reduction of the ground forces and tactical strike aircraft of both military alliances in Europe by 25 per cent (a total of more than one million officers and men) in comparison with their present level; subsequent cuts in the conventional armaments of all European countries, the United States and Canada. The procedure and technicalities of reduction and questions of control are set out in the Budapest programme.

What is the outlook for talks? In view of the state of affairs at the Vienna meeting, there is hope that a mandate for European talks will be agreed upon, for both sides have a stake in them. Should such a mandate be given, the talks could begin in 1988. They would be complicated and difficult. It is now hard to say how they would proceed. We think it is particularly important for the parties to come to terms on exchanging initial figures (overall ones and figures relating to each component of the talks) and on their content. This is what threatens a "controversy over figures", a threat which had better be removed at the beginning of the talks. This is no easy task but it can be accomplished provided the parties have the political will.

The Western propaganda media talks about so-called superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional armaments, which is said to imply that our country ought to carry out unilateral reductions. This assertion does not stand up to criticism. The West is careful not to make an in-depth analysis of the actual capabilities of the armed forces of the two sides, to examine the problem by comparing the military potentials in their entirety and not selectively, not by individual components of the armaments.

Confronting each other in Europe today are more than three-million-strong armies. They are roughly equal in combat capability. There is no complete symmetry between the armed forces, nor is it really possible. But there exists rough parity. In the opinion of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the overall balance of forces in conventional armaments is such that neither side commands sufficient aggregate power to guarantee victory. This is the main criterion of assessing the balance of NATO and WTO forces.

Indeed, what is the general balance of forces?

NATO and the WTO have a roughly equal strength and the number of artillery pieces. The WTO has more tanks than NATO which is superior in a number of combat-ready divisions and fighter-bombers. However, on the whole there is an approximate parity in conventional weapons.

Naturally, a question arises: What is to be done about imbalances? NATO has more warships, combat helicopters and strike tactical aviation, while the WTO has more tanks. The USSR is prepared to discuss the ways for eliminating this imbalance so as not to upset the military parity. In this field, too, we strive to be realists. It seems that this process will have its stages. Not everything can be settled at once. But we have, first of all, to begin negotiations with the view of finding solutions allowing to eliminate the asymmetry and disbalances and cardinally reduce confrontation on a reciprocal basis and lower the level of the military balance. It would be a major achievement.

This approach invites the fundamental conclusion that talks in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) have meaning only if they involve reciprocal and simultaneous reductions, the removal of imbalances and asymmetries.

We cannot but point to certain alarming trends that have lately made themselves felt in Europe.

The NATO countries are responding to the agreed elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by planning to replenish the nuclear arsenal of Europe. Plans provide for deploying additional US nuclear-capable aircraft in Britain, the FRG and elsewhere, plus many hundreds of long-range cruise missiles on ships; retargeting part of the Poseidon and Trident SLBMs as well as heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles for operations in Europe; stationing in West European countries new missiles with a range of up to 300 km; modernising the nuclear arms of Britain and France; building up other armaments, including fundamentally new conventional weapons.

The US and NATO leadership consider that additional arming should prevent any reduction of the saturation of Europe with arms. It follows that while removing intermediate-range missiles with one hand, the United States wants immediately to replace them with other nuclear weapons. This approach is at variance with the spirit of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and will not strengthen European security.

The Soviet Union is a peaceful country. Its Armed Forces have never threatened anyone, nor have they ever raised the sword first. Our people are fully committed to peace and are doing all in their power for the defence of world peace. They are working steadfastly for the prevention of nuclear war, for limitation and reduction of armaments, for complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is building its armed forces on the principle of adequacy for defence. What does this imply? As Soviet Defence Minister, General of the Army Yazov, noted, at the present stage adequacy of strategic nuclear forces is determined by the ability not to allow our country to be attacked by means of nuclear weapons with impunity in any situation, no matter how unfavourable. In the case of conventional armaments, adequacy implies the quantity as well as quality of armed forces and armaments that can reliably ensure the defence of the country. The limits of defence adequacy are conditioned by the actions of the United States and NATO. The Soviet Union neither seeks military superiority nor greater security, but it will neither accept lesser security for itself nor allow the other side to gain military superiority over it.

The Soviet Union is working to help reduce military potentials on a reciprocal basis to a level at which neither side, while seeing to its defences, will have the strength and means for a surprise attack or for offensive operations generally. It acts from these positions both at disarmament negotiations and in the international arena.

The Soviet Armed Forces are entrusted with the task of historic magnitude that of defending the gains of socialism and the cause of peace. They carry out their duty together with the armies of other socialist community countries. The defensive alliance of the fraternal socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, is a reliable proponent of the interests of peace and socialism. The Soviet Army vigilantly guards the peaceful creative labour of the Soviet people.

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Editors Invite Discussion of Headaches of 'Regimental Economy'

*18010367b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by Maj A. Plotnikov: "Money Exists, and There is Nothing With Which To Pay"]

[Text] I found the commander of the antiaircraft missile regiment in his office. Gennadiy Grigoryevich and Lt Vladimir Telegin, chief of the financial service, were sitting at a table, evidently engaged in monetary calculations.

"We are wracking our brains," explained the regiment commander. "Some equipment in the boiler room went out of order. Neither the KECh [billeting operation unit], nor the unit has the necessary specialists. We found such specialists in a neighboring factory, and they ask a reasonable amount, 500 rubles, to do the work. The money exists, but here Comrade Telegin states that it is not authorized. Am I right?"

Lt Telegin nodded his head in silence.

"Such expenditures are not provided for by the estimate," he explained. "And in general the commander is authorized to dispose of only the unit monetary fund, and even to expend these funds for strictly determined purposes."

"The most vexing thing is that the money exists," stated the regiment commander. "And we save, and if desired we can earn whatever is necessary ourselves in a lawful way, bringing benefit to people. Once I went to a store in

which they were selling industrial scrap to the population, and I offered as a product the packing used in ammunition boxes. The boxes themselves had been written off, and the packings were not subject to being returned, no one was keeping track of them. In the subunit they made shelves and dressers out of them, and then began simply to burn them. In the store they were glad to get them, and agreed to sell the packing at 20 kopeks each."

"Revenues from the store," commented Lt Telegin, "are disposed of in this way. I make up a payment authorization, drive to the bank and transfer the indicated sum into the state budget. We may not use it."

I have heard repeatedly from subunit commanders that they are bound hand and foot by rigid directives and instructions. For example, an electric light can be purchased solely according to one expenditure item, and a kerosene lamp solely according to another. Paint purchased for decorative needs may not be used to paint a fence. Is there any reason to be surprised that when such problems arise in troop administration the commander must solve brain-wracking tasks? At times, instead of organizing military training, he goes to obtain necessary materials, and removes personnel from their lessons.

One time in a garrison where I was serving extensive work was underway to organize the amenities of the military settlement and barracks. In the main these tasks were accomplished by an economic method that is at times quite understandably called the "grab method." All materials had to be delivered and "processed" in neighboring enterprises. Teams of motorized riflemen could be seen everywhere you looked, doing all kinds of things, far removed from training.

A good military settlement was organized, but at what price?

Frequently nowadays we make use of the words "a state approach," having in mind the ability to be concerned not about momentary advantage and narrow bureaucratic interests, but to be glad about the common good, and to look ahead and consider the "distant" economic effect. But how the shackles of obsolete instructions at times interfere with the state approach! Did they not for years form the psychology when savings were, to call a spade a spade, purely for show?

This is not to consider the various campaigns, beginnings and initiatives carried out at that time. I remember some 10 years ago, secretaries of komsomol committees persistently "sought out" zealous soldiers, and generalized and propagandized their experience. Undoubtedly this is necessary. But how was it organized?

I kept a notebook that had a title on its cover, "work to save material resources." Here, for example, is one of the notes that I made at that time: "Driver-mechanic Pvt S. Kochnev saved 40 liters of gasoline."

I extracted this figure from the transport work ticket following a command and staff exercise. Then I had a long talk with Kochnev and sought from him the secrets of such savings. The soldier knew no secrets, and I little by little led him to the thought that he, probably, had diligently regulated the carburetor and the ignition system, and had, apparently, tried to use special driving techniques, etc. At that moment I already had dreams about a stand entitled "How I Saved Fuel," with a photograph of Kochnev on it. But the driver did not understand me at all. The company commander, V. Shakhov, who had arrived then during the conversation, judging by everything, was bored with all of this, and he stated:

"Kochnev simply did not have to drive the vehicle as much in the exercises. But he is a conscientious soldier, so write about him boldly."

So I did. All inspectors invariably stopped near the colorfully set up stand, where the experience of soldiers in saving material resources was generalized. The "work" was obvious. Assessing it today, I will say that it not only did not achieve the desired result, but was even harmful, in that it diverted attention from real ways of economizing.

Not so long ago a claim check from the food service arrived in the financial section of the regiment about which we were speaking, in the amount of 137 rubles 83 kopecks, money from the sale of products from the unit welfare farm. Three-fourths of this amount we put in the monetary fund, and the rest was transferred to the account of the food organization. Is it advantageous to do this? It turns out that it is, even if all the expenditures are deducted. Yes, and 25 percent is an entirely acceptable tax of a sort on the earnings obtained.

Administrative personnel today are in principle interested in feeding of the pigs, breeding carp in the watershed, and growing vegetables in the unit welfare farms. But, there is no such interest in saving ammunition, fuel, electric energy, water and other resources. This is a more troublesome matter, and the unit monetary fund is not supplemented.

However, the commander is not in charge even of those monies that do exist. For example, funds from the unit farm today comprise more than 4,000 rubles. The officers assert that they could be increased ten fold, only there is no sense to it. These monies are sufficient for the authorized goals, and it is prohibited to use them for another purpose. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the year the unit requested 1,000 rubles for military training needs. Is this not a paradox? Their own earned money lies untouched, and it is necessary to request a state grant.

"Meanwhile, we have dozens of officers without apartments," states the regiment commander. You see, from the funds obtained from the unit welfare farm or

resource savings, a house could finally be built. But I am not authorized either to conclude an agreement with a construction organization, or to pay for the work of the builders. How many more administrative questions could be solved, advantageous both for the state and for the people, if part of the money from savings were put on our account, and if the commander were granted the right to dispose of it in the interest of the cause and the military collectives.

Skeptics may object: misuse is also possible. But, on the other hand, has rigid regulation of everything in the country's economy removed these problems? I think that the picture is the same at the level of the small, "regimental economy." Moreover, at times it is precisely various types of limitations that push commanders toward one or another violation.

In the light of those social and economic transformations that the country is now experiencing, it is no doubt already clear to everyone that he who knows that he will be given fairly the fruits of his successful work becomes the true good manager. Why should military subunits, that dispose of considerable material valuables, be an exception?

FROM THE EDITORS. The questions that the author has touched upon are, needless to say, contentious, and there may be the most varied points of view here. We invite the readers to continue the discussion and express their own opinion on the problems of the "regimental economy."

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The Armed Forces and New Thinking
18120076a Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 8, Feb 88 pp 12-13

[Interview with Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; date and place not given; first paragraph is NEW TIMES introduction]

[Text] NEW TIMES interviews Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces General Staff.

[Question] The Red Army was founded 70 years ago. The victory in the Great Patriotic War and the routing of fascism is a major landmark in its history. But some people in the West seem to forget this, turning the Red Army into a bogeyman. Are there any grounds for their fear?

[Answer] The myth about the aggressiveness of the Red Army is as old as the Red Army itself. When 14 states moved their troops from all sides against Soviet Russia, Western propaganda began to disseminate the lie about an "invasion by the Bolshevik hordes." Since then it has constantly intimidated people with the "red threat." The

more vigorous the fight for peace and the more peace initiatives the Soviet Union advances, the more subtle are the calumnies about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Army.

Now that the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is a real possibility, the opponents of disarmament have again turned to the subject of U.S.S.R.'s "superiority" in conventional weapons, tanks in particular. Moreover, our tanks are said to have fantastic performance, for instance, the ability to reach the English Channel in a matter of hours. According to Western news reports, Britain has started forming anti-tank brigades to repel a Soviet tank attack in Europe.

The "Soviet threat" is a fabrication of the military-industrial complex of the West. It is actively used to influence the population and exert pressure on governments and public opinion with the aim of maintaining arms production as a source of profits.

The real, and very dangerous, threat to peace comes from the military-industrial complex, which has a very damaging effect on the entire system of international relations.

[Question] Defence of their country and the routing of aggression have traditionally been the chief tasks of the armed forces. In our time there can be no winner in a war. How is this concept treated by the Soviet Army? Have the goals and tasks of the army changed in a society which sees the prevention of war as its most important objective?

[Answer] The first decree of the Soviet government was the Decree on Peace. The defence of our country has traditionally been considered the paramount task of the state and its Armed Forces.

The Programme of the CPSU and the documents of the 27th Party Congress point out that there will be no winners or losers in a global armed conflict. The task of averting war becomes particularly imperative in such circumstances. This makes it essential to raise the level of discipline and responsibility among servicemen, who must maintain a high degree of vigilance and improve their combat skill and preparedness. Defence of our country is a multifaceted concept. Who will gain the upper hand—the forces of peace or the forces of war? This depends on the contribution the Soviet Army makes to the cause of preventing war.

So, there can be winners, though not in nuclear war but in the struggle to avert it. The Soviet Armed Forces today defend both their own homeland and world peace.

[Question] There are two military blocs in Europe—the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Both blocs claim that their doctrines have a defensive character. But military confrontation is not over. In what way can the two blocs prove the sincerity of their intentions?

[Answer] Let me say first of all that the doctrinal principles of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are not the same, and that this explains the continued military confrontation. The chief objective of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine is prevention of war, while NATO's military doctrine contains aggressive provisions aimed at destroying socialism as a social and political system.

"Socialism resolutely rejects war as a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes between states," the 27th Congress of the CPSU pointed out. This determines the Soviet Union's fundamental policy of strengthening international security and peace by carrying out a complex of measures and programmes for broader international cooperation in the field of disarmament.

NATO regards war and combat operations not as an inadmissible form of interstate relations, but as a practical instrument for settling disputes and problems in its favour. This explains why NATO recognizes the U.S. concept of conflicts of high, medium and low intensity. To a certain extent, this concept found expression in the armed conflict unleashed by Britain against Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, in the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, the U.S. air attack on Libya, the armed intervention of France in the affairs of Chad, and other actions.

[Question] Do you see any possibility of cooperation with NATO in building a complex of confidence-building measures?

[Answer] Mikhail Gorbachev pointed to the possibility of cooperation with NATO in the provision of confidence-building measures: "We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all the data, evaluate them, clarify the asymmetry in armaments and troops, and start tackling the problems. Such is our approach."

The members of both alliances have declared that in their international relations they strictly observe the principles laid down in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Under the Stockholm agreements, they already practise such confidence-building measures as notification of military exercises and the invitation of observers to monitor them.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty states have called on NATO countries to reduce the arms and troop concentration on their contact line to a minimum agreed level, remove the most dangerous offensive weapons from this zone, set up a nuclear-free corridor along the contact line of the two blocs, and create in Europe zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons and with a lower concentration of armaments, and zones of enhanced confidence. All this is possible to achieve by mutual agreement and effort.

[Question] Democratization is perhaps the most important process now taking place in our country. It has spread to the army too. But what does democratization mean in the army?

[Answer] All the processes taking place in socialist society find their reflection in the Armed Forces as well. Perestroika in the army means a cardinal readjustment of mechanisms which have inhibited progress, the elimination of stagnant phenomena, and constructive, productive activity to improve the state of affairs in every field.

The whole complex of social relations is to be found in the army, which fully reflects the democratic character of our social system. Far from contradicting the service's regulations, democratism emphasizes the socialist nature of our Armed Forces. Of course, the process of democratization in the army and navy has its specific features, because one-man command, discipline and the execution of orders have to be combined with broad participation by Party and Young Communist League branches and all personnel in all affairs of military units.

The basic idea of democratization is that servicemen should be trusted more and display greater initiative and independence in their activity. The responsibility for the job entrusted to servicemen is being raised too. A creative approach by servicemen to their duties, and boldness in the tackling of complex problems help in the end considerably to enhance their self-awareness.

[Question] The new political thinking is clearly reflected in the foreign policy of our country. In what way has the new thinking influenced Soviet military doctrine?

[Answer] One of the basic realities of the present-day world is that there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence between countries with opposed socio-political systems. The new thinking engendered by the modern world persistently calls for an end to the arms race and a search for ways of disarmament. These principles have found their reflection in Soviet military doctrine, which represents a system of basic views on the prevention of war and armed forces development.

Soviet military doctrine has a defensive character, with defence regarded as the principal form of military operation in repelling aggression. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union is building up its Armed Forces on the principle of adequate defence.

Such an important doctrinal provision as renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons also accords with the new thinking. In this lies the fundamental distinction between Soviet military doctrine and NATO's doctrine, which provides for the first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

[Question] We often speak of education through historical example. How is such education conducted in the army?

[Answer] The inculcation of a cautious attitude to the past and to tradition and continuity in our historical development should occupy a special place in the training of future defenders of our country. Young people joining the army must clearly realize what they have been called upon to defend.

Our patriotism is inseparable from our history. The sources of one's love for one's country may differ, but the main thing here is unquestionably a knowledge of its history.

We have always drawn our strength from history. This was particularly evident in the years of trial that befell the Soviet people. This continuity was strikingly revealed during the Great Patriotic War. It is no accident that the orders of Alexander Nevsky, Bogdan Khmel-nitsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov and Nakhimov were instituted in those stern years.

Education through historical example and the heroic past, through revolutionary and combat traditions, should determine our whole approach in training the present generation of defenders of our country.

/6091

Russian Language Weakness Hinders Kirghiz Adaptation to Service

18010354 Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR in Russian
No 2, Mar-Apr 88 pp 134-139

[Article by A. Kanimetov under the rubric: "Reports"; entitled: "On the Question of the Study of the Russian Language in Kirghiziya".]

[Excerpt] According to information from the 1979 census, nearly one third of the Kirghiz named the Russian language as their second native tongue. Undoubtedly, now this indicator is somewhat higher. Despite definable changes in the mastery of the language of international society, among the core population of Kirghiziya, there remains a significant segment of young people, who have weakly mastered the Russian language or in general do not know it. This is particularly noticeable in rural areas. Many graduates of the average rural school are not able to enter a higher educational institution, and adapt poorly to the conditions of service in the Soviet army due to a weak knowledge of the Russian language. During a conference of the Republic aktiv on international upbringing, which took place during February of 1987, as an example a letter of a draftee from Saryseytov, serving in the Ukraine was brought forward. "For many," he wrote to the CC of the Kirghiz CP, "Kirghiz boys it is difficult to fulfill their military duty, because they do not all know Russian well." ...

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Role of 'Dedovshchina', Privilege Considered 18010250a Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA in Russian 17 Mar 88 p 4

[Interview with Maj Fedor Pugachev, Hero of the Soviet Union, by Maj Vasilii Zdanyuk, military journalist; date and place not given: "The 'Old-Timers' and the 'Green-horns'"]

[Text] Strange new terms have recently started appearing more and more frequently in the newspapers and journals: "greenhorns", "old-timers", "unbecoming mutual relations". Then there was the story "A Hundred Days Before Orders" published by the young writer Yuri Polyakov. Anxious dads, moms, grandfathers and grandmothers send letters to unit commanders a political workers, and they themselves visit distant garrisons to make sure with their own eyes that their sons and grandsons were being spared the "old-timer" problem.

What is this problem of unbecoming mutual relations in a military subunit? Why does it arise, what are its dangers, and how is it to be fought? Military journalist Major Vasilii Zdanyuk discusses this issue with Hero of the Soviet Union Major Fedor Pugachev, who served until recently in the Red Banner Belorussian Military District and who is now a student at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

[Pugachev] Briefly, unbecoming mutual relations may be described as the situation where certain servicemen acquire a privileged position by transferring their responsibilities to the shoulders of young soldiers. This pertains mostly to housekeeping chores and to personal areas. An example? Of course: A group of soldiers are given the task of cleaning up the motor pool area. Three build up a sweat working their brooms and shovels, while the fourth keeps cool, sitting somewhere in the shade, looking out for officers. He has provided himself with "comforts" by taking advantage of his status as a "morally superior", experienced person with more time in the army.

I would like to say quite categorically that unbecoming mutual relations are not a typical, mass phenomenon. In many subunits—I repeat, in many—there is not even a hint of them. But on the other hand we should not belittle this "hot" problem, or remain silent about it. As long as it does exist, we need to fight it.

[Zdanyuk] Fedor Ivanovich, I don't think that it is right say that the "old-timer" problem is one of time in service. The Red Army has inherited the best traditions of the Suvorov school. Let me recall that the punishment for degrading a soldier is very strict. And consider the Great Patriotic War: The veteran frontliners taught the

new recruits everything they knew, they were the first to rise to the attack, and they always shared their rations equally. No one then had ever heard about an "old-timer" problem. So where did it come from?

[Pugachev] I've heard it said that some psychologists and sociologists associate the origins of the "old-timer" problem with the general amnesty that followed Stalin's death, with the notion that former criminals were supposedly called into the army at that time. They supposedly brought with them their prison traditions, which gradually became accepted and took root in certain military collectives.

But from my point of view this is too simple an explanation. The basic causes are deeper. The "virus" of unbecoming mutual relations should be sought somewhere other than in the barracks.

The opinion exists that the army as a fragment of society, a copy of it in miniature. That's quite true. We're not in outer space, you know. And if negative processes such as protectionism, pretentiousness, ostentation and other so-called stagnant phenomena have flourished in society, it would be naive to suggest that they have passed the army by. "Convenient" commanders and political workers, ready to report the figures everyone wants to hear, to proclaim a "victorious" advance coincidental with a holiday. In anticipation of a visit by the top brass, such sorry commanders compelled their subordinates to groom and cut the lawns, while after the commission's departure the bed linens in the barracks were left unattended and the soldiers were not taken to the baths for weeks on end. I myself have gone through something like this several times. Once while I was serving in Afghanistan the battalion commander ordered me to jack up my platoon's firing score—it didn't look good in the record book. I refused, and I got the dog house for it.

Thus the "old-timer" problem is a product of negative phenomena that accumulated in our society in former years. The young man who dons a uniform today has already encountered social injustice, bribery and protectionism even before joining the army. He has seen the lines in the department stores, and he knows of the existence of special stores that are not open to just anybody; he wanted to play tennis, but he was not admitted to the club; he ends up in a motorized rifle regiment while a fellow classmate, the son of an influential city official, is able to evade the draft and continue his studies. Does all of this pass without leaving in imprint on the still-malleable personality?

Let me also say that unbecoming mutual relations are a sign of ignorance, of an inner emptiness, of a lack of spirituality. Analysis shows that most servicemen who insist especially strongly on their rights as "old-timers" are people of limited scope, of little reading experience, interested in neither literature nor art.

[Zdanyuk] Research shows that many soldiers had personally experienced the effects of the "old-timer" problem in what we might call its civilian version....

[Pugachev] Yes, that's true. Especially of graduates of vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums. I am especially attentive to such subordinates. After all, a primitive form of "old-timerism" often reigned in the residence halls in which they formerly lived. I recall one of my subordinates, Private Nikolay Oleynik. He almost ended up in the defendant's box before his term was up. On sorting things out with him, we discovered that he had become acquainted with the "old-timer" system back in vocational-technical school. During his first year he was obligated to obey senior classmen in all things unquestioningly. He had to rise whenever a boy two years older than himself came into the room, it was his duty to make the wine run to the store, and if he was ever disobedient, he was beaten and tormented. If he complained, he was shunned. This is the sort of "old-timerism", brazen and cruel, which some of our conscripts endure before joining the army.

[Zdanyuk] Fedor Ivanovich, were there cases of unbecoming relations in your company in Afghanistan?

[Pugachev] How can you even ask that question! My scouts disappeared in the mountains for weeks at a time, skirmishes occurred almost daily, and major battles were not unusual. This was no place for making distinctions between "old-timers" and "greenhorns". Afghanistan makes battle-wizened sages out of dummies in a single patrol. Out there the individual was always in the public eye. Boldness, decisiveness, cowardice—everything was in the open. My "old-timers" in Afghanistan were immediately recognizable: They were always where the fighting was the toughest, and when marching they carried two or three assault rifles or an ammunition box....

(Fedor Ivanovich fell silent and thoughtful. His face grew cloudy, and his black bushy eyebrows knitted together, creating a deep crease along the bridge of his nose.)

...The kishlak was suspiciously quiet to the scouts. The settlement appeared deathly still. But Pugachev knew that this was not so, that dozens of eyes were riveted on them from behind the bare window openings, with curiosity and with malice, with benevolence and with hatred. The scouts had already passed some razed houses along the narrow lane and were moving in a line along the channel of a dry stream when Fedor noticed a fleeting shadow behind a window.

"Hit the dirt!" Pugachev cried as he dropped to the ground.

In that instant bullets ricocheted from rocks and broke twigs off of the low brush. The fire was dense. Pugachev's subordinates were experienced soldiers who had studied

well the tricks and tactics of the enemy. No one panicked. Even the novices on their first patrol. Before the patrol they had all been "worked over" by the experienced privates and NCOs, who looked after them during the patrol as well.

After the first moments of battle Fedor realized that his subunit was surrounded. He knew that he would not be abandoned in his plight, that others were already hastening to his assistance. But it would be several hours before they would reach the kishlak. They had to hold on. The officer acted competently and prudently.

Sergeant Anatoliy Lybin, a clear-eyed Belorussian lad, crawled lizard-like toward an adobe house. A few minutes later Pugachev heard an exploding grenade and short bursts of automatic fire. And not long after that Lybin and his buddy appeared, sweating and dirty, their teeth flashing through their smiles.

"Everything's in order, Comrade Commander!"

With his small group of scouts Fedor tried to break out of the encirclement in the direction of the green zone. As he ran in an irrigation ditch he suddenly felt fire in his leg. He fell and crawled to cover. He glanced at his boot: It was ripped into shreds. His cap was also riddled.

Wounded in the arm and leg. Pugachev did not weaken his control over his subordinates for even a minute. Helping each other, they held their ground steadfastly. And they won the battle. Driver-mechanic Private Viktor Ivachev distinguished himself especially. He rammed his vehicle through a wall, creating a passage for the scouts.

This was one of 122 battles in which Pugachev had taken part. And he was successful in all of his undertakings. It is interesting to note that Pugachev's company never suffered any losses, and all of his subordinates were awarded orders and medals....

[Zdanyuk] Fedor Ivanovich, let's get back to unbecoming mutual relations. Some feel that they exist also because supposedly not all officers and warrant officers are waging a persistent fight against them, that there are some who find "old-timerism" advantageous.

[Pugachev] I knew of such officers. They tried to keep order in the barracks with the help of the "old-timers", who rode roughshod on the younger soldiers, "teaching" the recruits the ways of the world, thus relieving the officers of some of the disciplinary concerns. But this is the most dangerous kind of self-deceit!

What do I see as the solution? We need to teach officers, especially young ones, to work in a real, productive way with subordinates.

You know something I noticed some time ago? Deviations arise in the mutual relations between "old-timers" and "greenhorns" in part due to personal inconsistencies. We all know that experienced soldiers accept the hardest jobs in service and in combat training without any kind of duress, but when it comes to housekeeping chores, they are not averse to passing some of them off to the "greenhorns". Who likes scrubbing a dirty floor, cleaning toilets and raking piles of trash outside the barracks? Were we to set things right, put things in order, such work would not be interpreted as being demeaning.

[Zdanyuk] Many new and unusual things have recently been said about the army. Established notions are being placed in doubt. Take for example the idea that "the army is a school of education."

[Pugachev] It's a good thing that the winds of glasnost have blown through our armed forces. And even the doubts themselves have their use, especially if they rest on deep analysis, on a knowledge of the essence of the problems, rather than being an expression of shallowness, of a desire to blacken and find fault with our army. I have seen many things in my years of service, and let me say frankly that I have known witless dullards who remained dullards on their return to civilian life, but I have not yet come across strong, willful lads who became materialistic and faceless after the army.

Let me say in conclusion that strict and decisive measures are taken against violators, going as far as criminal proceedings. I am certain that this entire complex of measures will result in the complete eradication of "old-timerism".

11004

Lt Gen Galkin on March Training Shortcomings in NGF

*18010348a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Article: "Testing by a March; Combat Training: Returning to What Was Published"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] On 17 October of last year, the article by Lt Col A. Manushkin: "Tanks on the Side of the Road" disclosed shortcomings in the march training of a number of subunits from the Northern Group of Forces [NGF]. At the request of the editors, the commander of the tank battalion, Guards Maj V. Gergel, the deputy battalion commander for weaponry, Guards Maj A. Blagodarnyy, and the senior officer of the combat training section of the group of forces, Col P. Saburov, describe what has been undertaken and what is to be undertaken for improving this. [End of Editorial Introduction]

Guards Maj V. Gergel: The first thing that we have done is to conduct exercises with all drivers and here we worked through questions related to readying the equipment for a long-distance march. The officers exchanged experience in the psychological preparation of the personnel for operations under difficult conditions. Exercises in driving the combat vehicles in a column became regular. All of this, of course, played a role in the fact that in a repeat inspection many subunits looked much better on the march.

Of course, it is still too early to say that the problem has been resolved. The work which we commenced requires an energetic continuation. Naturally, it involves the search for more effective approaches to training personnel. At present all the commanders and service specialists are focused on this.

Guards Maj A. Blagodarnyy: The article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA described just how weak was our technical support for the march. Considering the lessons, we began more frequently to conduct exercises not only with the drivers but also with other specialists. We teach them to eliminate malfunctions directly on the equipment under field conditions, how to act in the event that the vehicle becomes stuck and so forth. We also work on the questions of refueling on the march.

The maintenance echelon has begun to work better as well. Now its specialists, in leaving for the march, no longer forget spare parts, oil and other essential materials. Proof of this is the recent multi-kilometer march. If a tank halted, specialists immediately hurried up to it. They quickly ascertained the reason for the halt and helped eliminate the malfunction.

Col P. Saburov: The command and military council of the group of forces have made a detailed study of the mistakes and oversights committed. A plan for eliminating the shortcomings was approved. In carrying it out, we

conducted staff drills in controlling the subunits on a march. With the officer personnel a study was made again of the guiding documents on organizing a long-distance march. Exercises were conducted where we worked through the questions of organizing political, rear and technical support, traffic control and check-point services, and reconnaissance of the routes was carried out.

The results of the work done can be judged, obviously, from a recent inspection in regiment X. We feel that there is no need to comment on the fact that, for example, all the tanks in the battalion under the command of Guards Maj Gergel reached the area by the designated time and in combat readiness. Here there were many drivers in the battalion who are young soldiers just arriving from training subunits. Not everyone, in truth, withstood the pressure. Some had to be helped. Incidentally, I would like to particularly mention this. During long marches the drivers are under a particularly heavy stress. So in order to avoid failures, a number of units are training back-up drivers. They have decided to also employ this experience in the regiment described.

However, the designated regiment is still far from adopting and introducing all the best which exists in the other units. For example, during a recent inspection it turned out that not all the tank troops had been trained in driving using the night vision instruments. Here, of course, there is blame also for the officers of the combat training section of the group of forces. We must more strongly demand that the commanders conduct marches under conditions as close as possible to actual combat.

Generally speaking, we still have not succeeded in resolving many questions of organizing march training on the proper level. While with the driving of tracked vehicles in columns we have somewhat corrected things, for the wheeled equipment there still are problems. In particular, we still see it lagging behind on the march.

On the other hand, we do have tank subunits which during recent inspections demonstrated high march skills. Many simply do not know about their experience. I feel that here also our section has left things undone. At present, in truth, we have assembled all the essential data and we are analyzing and generalizing these in order to provide experience for all subunits. In each battalion and in each company there should be a standard method for march training of the personnel considering the local conditions.

Participating in an inspection of the subunits was the Chief of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Lt Gen A. Galkin. We publish his commentary.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that during the last autumn the "lightning struck" not only in the NGF but also in our directorate. Yes, we had previously repeatedly encountered shortcomings in march training in the various units. We ascertained their causes in each specific instance and, naturally, took the appropriate measures on the spot. However, the shortcomings pointed out in the training of certain subunits and which were so widely publicized, it must be admitted, were unexpected for us. It suddenly became apparent that the failure of the tank troops could not be explained merely by shortcomings on the part of individual officials, although this was certainly present here. Life urgently demanded the search for more profound reasons.

At present, it can probably be said that some of these reasons have been found. Of course, the suddenly conducted march would scarcely have ended so lamentably if all the officers had performed their duties in an exemplary manner and if each man in his place had acted irreproachably. But at the same time the specialists from the Main Armored Directorate working in the group's units have concluded that there must also be a revision of the training methods for the tank troops. Over a period of many years the accent in the training of tank crews has been put on bringing the training level of each specialist up to the point of being automatic. In and of itself, such an approach causes no doubt. However, many have seen in this the only guarantee for precise actions both by the individual crews and entire subunits. At the same time practice has shown that such an approach does not completely meet modern requirements. Equipment is developing rapidly. In order to master it perfectly, it is essential to have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities residing in it and be able to employ these with the greatest effectiveness. In a word, in addition to high training, a tankman must have deeper technical knowledge than before. And the methods for training them should take this into account.

Precisely this was discussed at the military technical conference held in the NGF. Participating in it were representatives of the various specialties and technical services. In the course of the conference the men saw better what capabilities the designers had put in the combat vehicles and how to get maximum effectiveness in operating them. In turn, they also voiced a number of comments and proposals.

I am convinced that all this work has played a role in being able over a comparatively short period of time to raise significantly the level of march training for many tankmen. At the same time, I should point out that the desired results have still not been reached. This is largely, it seems to me, due to the fact that at present not all the officers in the regiment which was at one time sharply criticized in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have been able to free themselves of parasitic attitudes.

Yes, things have made headway. In the regiment they have rapidly been able to improve significantly the training facilities. And no extra money for this has been

granted above the standards set for the unit. The Main Armored Directorate, of course, has provided aid but this consisted merely in ensuring the proper deliveries and making certain that the regiment received everything necessary on time. The tank troops themselves basically reequipped the training facilities. Innovators made a portion of the auxiliary equipment themselves. All of this instills optimism. However, Guards Maj Gergel has pointed out that it is too early to speak about a complete resolution of all problems involved in march training in the subunits. For example, a repeat march showed that the back-up drivers are still poorly trained. Moreover, very few of them have been trained as yet. Generally speaking, it must be said that in the group of forces as a whole this good initiative has found its supporters far from everywhere.

In a word, both ourselves and the officers in the units have much work to do to improve march training for the tank subunits. The experience gained in recent months in the NGF will be good support in this work. We are presently taking measures so that the line found there in training the tank troops will become predominant in all the districts.

10272

Col Gen Merimskiy Discusses Experiment on Cadet Training

18010368a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen V. Merimskiy: "Do Not Stop Half Way"]

[Text] "An Afterword to the Experiment" was the title given to the correspondence of Lt Col S. Pashayev, published on 22 January. It discussed how long it took and how difficult it was for the long term method of training students in training subunits to make its way. The newspaper article occasioned responses from the readers. Letters came to the editors from troop commanders and political officers, instructors at military schools, military faculties of civilian VUZes and DOSAAF courses, and military training officers at schools, technical schools and SPTU [rural vocational and technical schools]. Specialists from the USSR KGB border troops and the USSR MVD internal troops displayed interest in the new methodology. We are presenting some of the letters in the selection being published. Our correspondent asked Col Gen V. Merimskiy, deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces for Military Training, to answer some of the questions prompted by the mail.

Comrade Colonel General, what has changed in the time passed since publication, and how are all the problems it touched being solved?

I will begin by saying that in general the introduction of a new methodology into military training practice is not a simple matter. You see, neither directive instructions,

nor demonstration exercises will suffice, since we are talking about reexamination of the system of views on training that have taken shape, and restructuring of this entire process. Correspondingly, substantial changes are also required in material-technical equipment for training junior specialists, in the training program, and in the organization of lessons. At the same time, this is only one aspect of the matter. It is still necessary to teach and convince of the advisability and effectiveness of the innovation the large detachment of class leaders, and to break the psychological stereotype that has taken shape over the years.

We began with a large-scale experiment, not because we doubted in the effectiveness of the methodology. During the course of the experiment that involved the training units of the Moscow Military District, along with approval of the new techniques in the work, practical experience was acquired, and problems that those who were to go further might confront in one or another situation were revealed and, to the extent possible, solved on the spot. I believe that, on the whole, we succeeded in this. However, I must say that the brief time periods for transition to the new methodology turned out to be more complex everywhere than we had imagined.

Why was it more complex, and in what questions specifically did hitches arise? Many reasons are disclosed in the correspondence "An Afterword to the Experiment." I can add to those statements the fact that even today changes for the better are few. We analyzed the results of the work of officers of the Ground Forces Main Military Training Directorate who recently visited the forces to monitor and assist in the organization of the training process. And here is what was learned. In units where our recommendations on introduction of the new methodology were fulfilled, and where commanders responsibly and creatively approached the work, advances are notable. For example, there already is something to imitate, in my view, in the training units of the Leningrad and Carpathian military districts. At the same time, the facts indicate that many officers, especially among those who directly train students, still are unable to conduct lessons in the new way. This is reality.

Also of concern is the fact that the training cards being developed in the units far from always are optimal in content. Here and there the training and material base is slow to be restructured. All of these questions are now being monitored strictly.

What specifically is being done to improve the training of class leaders?

Meetings and instructors' methodological classes have been held. A special textbook has been published to explain more extensively the essence of the new methodology and special features of its employment. It sets forth rather completely the basics of the methodology, which, I am sure, everyone will be able to understand.

Work is underway to prepare textbooks for individual subjects. In the future a new textbook based on the training cards will be created. Since last year we have begun to familiarize the students of some military schools with the basics of the methodology of step-by-step and systematic inculcation of knowledge and skills. In particular, this refers to the Leningrad, Tashkent and Kazan military schools. So far the units have standard training cards that can be used for their own development.

However, the quality of the UTK [training cards], as many readers write, leaves something to be desired. What is the reason for this?

This is explained, in particular, by the fact that initially people were involved in development of the training cards in units who did not have, let us say, sufficient methodological experience and high professional knowledge on the subject being studied. When this work was accomplished solely by skilled specialists it was appropriately prepared. It is no secret that many of those who were familiar with the methodology by hearsay gained the impression that it was enough to copy a certain text from a training aid and—here you have an UTK. This is a delusion. As, by the way, it is also a delusion that from now on there is no longer a need to prepare seriously for lessons, since, instead of a detailed course outline the leader must have only a plan and UTK.

The editors' mail contains many letters whose authors learned about the existence of the methodology from the newspaper. They are interested, naturally, in its fundamental difference from the traditional methods. What can you say about this?

To retell a methodology that is based on scientific theory is, to be frank, a thankless task. But, in principle, its practical distinction is most of all that assimilation of the training material, formation of skills and training practice by the students are implemented not sequentially, as before, but simultaneously. And they are done independently immediately, and without any errors. Otherwise, as we have become accustomed, first we listen and learn how, say, a tank engine is turned on, then we watch as an instructor does this, and finally we try to repeat everything ourselves. Here the students immediately begin to carry out actions according to the diagram detailed on the UTK.

An important advantage of this methodology is the active participation in the class immediately by all students. A subunit is broken down into training groups of three. One reads aloud the entire training card. Its text includes all necessary information, shows the sequence of actions and the interrelationship of key concepts. The second actually carries out the work. The third, uttering the text aloud immediately afterward, monitors the actions of the second. Then the students change roles.

The second stage of the lesson is actions by the students using an abbreviated card. The third is solving test tasks on the technique or action being studied, but already without a card. Thus, the material is worked out jointly, repeated numerous times, and the actions of the students are meaningful in nature. I am not even speaking about the fact that a properly compiled card to some degree compensates for differences in the level of training of the leaders, and that it is invaluable daily speaking practice in and of itself, especially for those whose knowledge of Russian is weak.

I would add that the new methodology is not only promising, but is simply necessary. It is, if you wish, a concrete mark of restructuring. And it concerns a most important issue, military training of the forces.

In conclusion is an organizational question that the readers touched upon. Would it not be more advisable to create a special scientific methodology group made up of professional pedagogues, psychologists and specialists in the field of military training? It could, as, for example, Lt Col S. Marzoyev proposes, engage in centralized development of training material, analysis, introduction of necessary adjustments to the training process, and subsequent research in the field of military training methodology.

This proposal is being studied. I must say that it has its advocates and opponents. So we will not hasten events.

9069

Readers Response on Cadet Training Experiment
18010368b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2

[Various Letters to the Editor: "The Matter is Moving Slowly"]

[Text] "The Afterword to the Experiment" agitated me especially, because I also am involved in introduction of the methodology being discussed. In 1985 as a specialist-psychologist I was sent on a trip to the Ground Forces Main Military Training Directorate, to the group that was involved in this. After the decision was made to introduce the methodology in training units we could seemingly celebrate victory. But, as you see, even today the matter is moving forward with great birth pangs.

What are the reasons for this? They are no doubt many. But, I think, Capt 1st Rank Khoziyev is correct. He wrote that without skilled specialists, and without science as such one could not manage in this matter. Meanwhile, scientific forces are little involved. The newspapers wrote about the troubles with Khoziyev. I will talk about myself. In 1987 I defended a dissertation at a competition for the academic degree of candidate of psychological sciences. After the conclusion of the experiment in the Moscow Military District training units, I was offered the opportunity to continue to serve in the apparatus of the Ground Forces Main Military Training

Directorate. But, in the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Armor Directorate, to which the unit where I am serving is subordinate, they rejected the transfer. Their motivation was that we brought up this specialist and we need him ourselves. And I am now involved in questions that are far from psychology and from science in general.

I think that the newspaper should not stop halfway. Intensification of military training is a vitally necessary matter. And the new methodology here can be of good use. (Maj I. Ivanisenko)

The author of the correspondence sees the widespread introduction of the theory of "step by step formation of mental actions" as a way to save us from numerous methodological errors. But, in the first place, he did not disclose the essence of the mentioned theory. In the second place, why create in the inexperienced reader the opinion that its use removes numerous problems in military didactics. I also experimented for many years, and I will tell you that often it is not a matter of theoretical foundations, but of banal causes that interfere with training—absence from classes, low level of instruction.

Articles of this type deflect us from the main problems and cause illusions: It is necessary, they say, to make use of some new training concept, push aside the retrograde concept and push forward the advanced "diktat," and everything will be all right in the end. (V. Marishchuk, doctor of psychological sciences, professor, Leningrad)

In the early 1970s I also was involved in introduction of a methodology based on Professor Galperin's theory, into the practice of training young mine warfare specialist sailors. In March 1978 I also appealed to the USSR Ministry of Defense and suggested that a single scientific methodological center be created. My letter was sent to the Ground Forces Main Military Training Directorate, from where I soon received an answer. They expressed to me "gratitude for my concern about improving personnel training" and reported that "the question of creating such a center is being studied." Having read the correspondence "An Afterword to the Experiment," I saw how this study had dragged out. (Col (Ret) V. Butrov, Sevastopol)

I consider the newspaper article timely and principled. I am myself the leader of an experimental training group in the military faculty of the Dnepropetrovsk Mining Institute. In this group we actively use the developments of S. Syedin and B. Khoziyev. The methodology gives significantly higher results than the traditional methodology. This is obvious, and those who come to the faculty for experience unanimously confirm it. But, in order to introduce the promising methodology, not only words and not only experiments are needed. An appropriate base is needed, as are courses for training methodologists and, of course, a scientific-practical center, about which the article spoke. Otherwise, you see, what happens is that they are still reinventing the wheel everywhere. (Lt

Col A. Rydzevskiy, senior instructor, military faculty, Dnepropetrovsk Mining Institute)

I believe that the new methodology is being introduced successfully in our unit. However, we are also confronting difficulties. In particular, the UTKs [training cards] are still being developed at a low level, and the class leaders, due to a lack of necessary knowledge and skills, are not fully using existing potential capabilities.

We discussed the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publication at a session of the methodological soviet. All unit officers unanimously favored further introduction of the new training methodology, seeing in it one of the ways of intensifying military training and improving its quality. (Gds Maj Yu. Simonov, Belorussian Military District)

9069

Trinitrotoluene Explosion at PVO Unit Near Khabarovsk

LD0207075288 Moscow TASS in English 0743 GMT
2 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS—An explosion took place in the area of deployment of an anti-aircraft unit near Khabarovsk late at night on June 29, the newspaper IZVESTIYA reports today. No casualties are reported.

I. Kudrov, deputy chairman of the regional party committee and head of an emergency commission for eliminating the consequences of the accident, said that glass windows had been blown out in about 200 houses in a residential area of Khabarovsk, window frames and inner sashes had been damaged, shop windows had been broken in 38 shops. Apart from it, 14 kindergartens, two hospitals and 16 schools were damaged.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, told an IZVESTIYA correspondent in Moscow: "It is true that an explosion took place eight kilometres south of Khabarovsk. Some eight tons of trinitrotoluene kept in military warehouses blew up. There are no casualties, but some people were wounded. Most of them were cut by the glass blown out of windows by a blast. No serious damage was reported. At present army units and the local population are eliminating the consequences of the accident. Window-panes are being put in, minor repair work is being done".

A commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense was set up for investigating into the causes of the accident. The commission has started working already.

Follow-Up on Investigation of Military-Transport Aviation

18010369 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 May 88 First Edition p 2

[Unsigned article: "They are Deceiving the Newspaper"]

[Text] On 28 April a critical letter by Col V. Kiryazov was published under this title. It discussed the unprincipled approach taken by representatives of military-transport aviation toward checking the facts set forth in correspondence by Maj V. Brovkin, "Forgotten Depot," published on 26 June 1987, and in the letter to the editors written by Officer F. Gusev, the depot chief.

As Maj Gen Avn A. Sidorov, first deputy chief, VVS [Air Forces] political directorate, reported, the article in the paper was discussed at a meeting with the deputy commanders of VTA [Military-Transport Aviation], and in the rear services political department and party organization. The criticism by the newspaper was acknowledged to be correct. In June 1987 the depot in fact was not completely equipped with organic equipment and loading-offloading mechanisms. Administrative methods of leadership, red tape, and the lack of timely

monitoring and assistance to the depot by Maj Gen Avn V. Prokofyev and Col V. Turovets were the basic cause of all the difficulties that interfered with its normal functioning.

Through the fault of VTA officials the depot was not supplied with all types of provisions at its place of stationing, and, therefore, for a long period of time was not supported with any funds. No control was exerted over its manning with cadres or equipping with materials and equipment. Officer F. Gusev, the depot chief, received no answers to his requests for assistance.

The reply also noted that Maj Gen Avn V. Prokofyev indeed was crude in his attitude toward officers F. Gusev and V. Mironets. He apologized to them and rescinded the punishments previously given to them. At the decision of the VTA commander, both officers were paid full monetary compensation.

The trip to Moscow by Officer Gusev that was discussed in the paper was paid for. The officer is characterized positively, and enjoys professional authority from his subordinates. There are no grounds for demoting him in position or transferring him.

Criticism of the VTA, and of the military unit political organs that provide party-political support to the depot, was acknowledged as objective. Leadership of the activity of the depot party organization by the unit political department and its chief was weak. Officers from the political department during this period took part in preparing and holding only one party and one komsomol meeting.

The author of the reply informs us that at present the depot is fully manned and has all of its automotive equipment, 95 percent of its loading and offloading mechanisms, all necessary means of communication, and is able to fulfill completely its assigned work. The depot is handling its planning targets.

According to the results of checking the newspaper article, the VTA commander-in-chief gave Maj Gen Avn V. Prokofyev a strict reprimand. His deputy, Col V. Kosmosov was reprimanded, and Col V. Turovets was given a strict reprimand. Communists Prokofyev and Turovets were also brought to party accountability.

It was recommended to the rear services command and party organization that appropriate steps be taken with respect to the other officials who were at fault. The VTA political department has drawn conclusions from the critical newspaper article. In March of this year at meetings of the chiefs of VTA political organs, the status of the leadership provided by party organizations was analyzed, and measures to improve it, and to increase their role in solving the tasks facing the units and subunits, were discussed.

The results of the work with letters and statements by military personnel and members of their families have been examined at a session of the VVS Military Soviet. An order has been sent to the forces instructing commanders and political officers of units, large units, and VVS in the military districts and groups of forces to react efficiently and more responsibly to letters. The attention of chiefs of political organs was directed to their personal responsibility for the timely examination of and taking of measures in response to items published in the press.

9069

Mar Avn Kirsanov on Importance of Flight Safety, Regulations to Combat Training

*18010366a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by Mar Avn P. Kirsanov, deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Forces and Honored Military Pilot of the USSR: "There Are No Minor Details on This Question"]

[Text] Flight service knows no breaks. Grounding has always been perceived by aviators as a step toward reduced combat skill. Only in intense and daily labor is there a rise in the mastery of the complicated equipment and weapons. Training flights develop group teamwork, coordination of the flight and ground specialists and smooth combat control.

One of the important indicators for the level of the combat training of aviators, as is known, is flight safety, that is, the absence of accidents in the course of the work of the air units and subunits.

Accidents, it can be said, are a sort of criterion for the degree of the actual combat readiness of the air crews, subunits and units. If a pilot, in intercepting a bogey, stalls or on the range falls into the fragments of the ammunition released by him against the bogey, if an aircraft technician forgets to fuel up the aircraft or the flight controller permits a takeoff with the strip occupied by another airplane—what can one expect from these specialists in an actual combat situation? Certainly, enemy fire greatly exacerbates the possibility of making various errors which can lead to unjustified losses. As the experience of the Great Patriotic War reminds us, we lost many combat friends not only from enemy fire but also due to the failure to consider the particular features of the weather, unwise recklessness and other ridiculous accidents.

At present the technical reliability of the airplanes and helicopters has risen significantly. The development of in-flight automatic devices and precision landing systems ensures the executing of many flight elements under conditions which were until quite recently considered absolutely unthinkable. Considering this, there have

been changes in the standard documents and the procedures for training the flight personnel. All of this makes it possible at present for many aviators to work for a long times without accidents and disasters.

However, unfortunately, the increased work safety of the aviators has gone much more slowly than our possibilities would allow. Accidents continue to disrupt the normal pace of combat training. Alas, there is also a definite underestimation of preventive work in ensuring flight safety and this is frequently carried out with obvious delays. On the questions of working for flight safety there are still phenomena of stagnation and without decisive overcoming of these the preventive measures as before will be too late.

For example, let us take such an element in providing flight safety as discovering the reasons for accidents. The more accurately these factors are determined, the more effective the range of measures to prevent their repetition. At present, it must honestly admitted, in investigating accidents many officials, both those responsible for what happened as well as those conducting the investigation, endeavor, unfortunately, to simplify this. And the simplest way for this is obvious, that is, restricting the range of factors which led to the specific instance. Frequently the investigation is terminated by the pointing out of one factor which is most apparent in the denouement of an accident.

However, each accident occurs, judging from my own experience, as a consequence of the coinciding of several factors. In following one after another or occurring simultaneously, they lead to an emergency situation and then contribute to its development during the flight.

...During night flights with minimum weather in the bomber regiment which until recently was under the command of Col V. Gerasimov, the engines failed on one of the aircraft. As was learned, this was aided by an entire chain of deviations from the flight preparation and organization rules. Thus, a complicated group of these was not envisaged and not worked through in the preflight training. Hence the passivity of the leadership group with the rise of the situation which, incidentally, could have been anticipated if the crew of the weather reconnaissance plane had promptly reported the presence of icing conditions in the clouds. In the preflight instructions the pilots were not warned about this danger. Later a mistake was made by the crew members themselves: they did not turn on the deicing system of the engines either prior to the takeoff, as is required by the instructions, or even after entering the clouds. For this reason icing appeared on the intakes of the propulsion units. Pieces of ice also got into the engines...

There were also other deviations from the flight rules. In investigating this case, it turned out that similar individual errors had been made previously in the given unit,

but individually they had not led to the causes of a potential accident. They were not eliminated and were repeated until the given coinciding of them occurred in the specific flight.

And as the causality of flight accidents has a comprehensive nature, their guaranteed prevention also should be carried out on a comprehensive basis, by the efforts of all the services of the aviation and maintenance units. In such an interaction the position of each flyer should be active and self-critical. In actuality the reverse frequently occurs. At times, for example, the pilots using the flight monitoring materials search primarily for technical failures while the engineers look for pilot errors. Some endeavor to conceal their passivity by narrow professional concerns and by justifications of the sort "I was not informed" and "I did not know." All of this causes great harm to the maintaining of proper flight safety.

Thus, the case with the bomber icing could have been prevented by the crew members had they suggested to each other that the engine heater must be turned on in the stages of the flight as set by the instructions. The weatherman on duty, having shown initiative, could have ascertained through the weather bureaus of adjacent airfields whether the forecasted icing was actually present. The flight controller for some reason did not ask the crew of the weather reconnaissance plane about the presence of dangerous phenomena while the representatives of the formation staff and the crews of the superior command posts did not properly monitor the correctness of taking the decision for the flights and carrying out all the established elements of their organization. Here we can see how many preventive screens there were. But none of them, alas, was put into use.

With the development of equipment, flying does not become easier and the stress factor on a man both in the air and on the ground does not decline. Hence, the greater demands made on the pilot the role of whom in ensuring safe work in the air at present is very great. Prior to each flight he must assimilate a mass of diverse information, go through the inspection of numerous commanders as well as the superiors and inspectors in the unit. And what if the pilot, in addition, is burdened down with the difficult commander duties as the indoctrinator of the soldiers, the sergeants, the warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers, and as the organizer of their service, combat training and everyday life?

Under such conditions it is certainly not easy for him to prepare effectively for all possible variations of work in the sky. And often oversights for one or several elements of the obligatory preparations lead to a situation which the pilot creates for himself. Such a case, for example, occurred with the squadron chief of staff, Maj Yu. Ivankovskiy. Having given chief attention to his numerous official duties, the pilot prepared hurriedly for a difficult advanced flight. He did not make a detailed work-through of the advanced flight figures on the ground, relying on his experience. But this experience let

the pilot down. He stalled in one of the advanced flight figures. Not long before this the regiment had received exhaustive information on the reasons for a similar case in another unit. But the regiment's command had not demanded that all subordinates, including Ivankovskiy, firmly master those recommendations which each pilot should have observed scrupulously in order not to fall into a similar situation.

Nor have we yet excluded, unfortunately, instances when experienced pilots show outright recklessness, relying on their experience. For this reason a major error in piloting techniques was made by Col N. Chava. In making flights in the regiment being monitored by him, he decided to demonstrate a "superior class" of flying. He came in to the landing strip in such a manner that the aircraft's tail scraped the concrete slabs. It was only by a miracle that this flight did not end tragically. I feel that there is no need to show what influence this example by a superior chief had on the regiment's aviators....

In speaking about the role of the pilot in ensuring safety in the air, I cannot help but mention that the completeness and quality of his preparations for a specific flight are substantially influenced by the aviator's personal focus on studying the details of the forthcoming flight mission. It is clearest to him which elements he knows firmly and which superficially. A strong-willed pilot will endeavor to eliminate the existing flaws in the course of self-preparation. But there are still numerous instances discovered in the course of inspections when self-preparation in the aviation regiments is actually replaced by numerous unplanned exercises where it is a question of doing what one likes.

The commander of an air regiment has a great deal to do to ensure flight safety. In organizing the work of his assistants, a thinking commander actively influences the creation of conditions for the flight and engineer-technical personnel which would exclude the main factors in the development of emergency situations such as hurry and formalism in performing many elements of the preliminary preparations. It is his task to see to it that the flight accident prevention measures are incorporated in the daily life of the unit.

Incidentally, in the presently existing instructional documents to ensure flight safety, there is no lack of explanations for the principles of prevention and its importance. But, unfortunately, the documents give much less space to showing the forms and methods of specific work in the units. This, alas, is also a failing of the programs of the Air Forces training institutions on the given problem. In my view, the time has come to eliminate this disproportion and pay more attention to disseminating the experience of the best commanders.

The experience of the leading commanders shows that in the daily combat training it is important to achieve the strict observance of all the rules, and rely on an analysis of the state of the current training of one's pilots, the

frequency of repetition of their errors as well as on the informational materials concerning the accident rate during analogous combat training periods over several previous years.

An experienced commander is not indifferent to formalism in the training of subordinate pilots and himself does not set a negative example in this. But most importantly, he never permits oversights in the planning and execution of the flights to be concealed by the later issuing of "camouflaging" orders, by redoing the flight planning tables or by "fake" comments in the plans and logs. For he knows that this develops in subordinates the habit of merely drawing up the papers correctly, but getting away with a violation.

Flight safety is a matter of state importance. On this question there are no minor details and it is important for each aviator to firmly assimilate this and unswervingly carry it out. The disclosure of the reasons for accidents and preventive work against them require a competent and comprehensive approach. Only in such an instance will a situation be created in the air units which does not permit accidents caused by the flight personnel.

10272

Debate on Strict Adherence to Flight Regulations
18080036b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article, published under the heading "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has Acted: Replies and Answer," by Capt S. Goroshin, units deputy chief of staff and Military Pilot 2d Class: "Horizons of Initiative. What Restricts Them?"]

[Text] I am confident that there is nothing more dangerous than indifference to one's profession. For this reason, I am pleased by the sincerity of the responses from my aviator comrades. And I am disappointed when some tacit omission in encountered in the materials. As an example, let me cite the article by Lt Col V. Korotovskiy and Capt S. Frolov entitled "Hobbled Initiative" (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 20 March 1988).

The authors raised an important and painful question, that is, the stagnation in the tactical skills of flight personnel and the desire to conduct training under oversimplified conditions. If someone said, in fighting for the honor the military, that such shortcomings are merely a particular instance characteristic of the regiment pointed out in the article, I would never agree to this.

The article "Hobbled Initiative" has drawn the pointed conclusion that "the main reason for inhibition... is the fact that the documents which regulate flying do not make provision for creative decisions."

In my view, the improving of flight personnel skills should be ongoing and planned and include three inter-related areas: the introduction of new flight elements into combat training, the complicating of conditions and the gradual hardening of the standards. The present constant repetition of the same program exercises by the pilots does not meet such requirements.

The authors of the article have accurately pointed out that at present the flights "...in the literal sense are standardized from takeoff to landing." At the same time the authors fail to state that standardization is the basic principle in the existing flying methods expressed as a strict sequence of admissions of a pilot to independently perform flight missions. As a whole, instruction is organized according to the principle of from the simple to the complicated. And the more accurately and the more specifically each exercise is scheduled, the more effectively the procedures perform their role. At the same time, practice indicates that even an average level of pilot training makes it possible to alter the flight mission for him in a rather broad range. In this instance the procedures do not guarantee the ensuring of safety in the air and for this reason view any change in the assignments previously worked in an inspection flight as a lack of discipline on the part of the pilot.

The question arises of whether the existing training methods are a brake on the improvement of flight skills and whether they fetter the pilots' initiative? Is it actually possible in a training program to provide a number of exercises which would suffice a pilot for all this service in aviation and so that each subsequent flight would be more complicated than the previous one, as Col P. Chernenko has proposed in the article "Lost Mastery" published in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 3 July 1986? In my view, the present-day training methods do not abet this, just like our individual efforts to introduce or update something somewhere. For this reason, the problems of improving combat skill and developing initiative cannot be solved "at meetings and conferences," as the authors of the article "Hobbled Initiative" advise.

Flight work is a complex and diverse process. In it everything is interrelated and here there are no minor details. For this reason, while recognizing the imperfection of the current training methods, we must not permit the violating of the requirements of the guiding documents which seem to the authors of the article as not conforming to modern combat and to the development of equipment and as restricting the pilot's initiative. I am categorically against such initiative which results in the death of people and the loss of costly equipment.

10272

Operations of Cruiser 'Admiral Tributs' in Persian Gulf

*18010379a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 May 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by Capt Lt I. Yusupov: "A Special Watch"]

[Text] "I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in January that the large antisubmarine ship Admiral Tributs has embarked upon its mission of insuring peaceful navigation in the Persian Gulf. I would like to know what the crew is doing in the Gulf."

N. Vetrov, war veteran, former petty officer 1st class, Barnaul.

The editor's office contacted the large antisubmarine ship Admiral Tributs by radio and transmitted its reader's question. Here is the answer that came back.

Our ship has escorted over 10 Soviet dry-cargo ships and tankers in the Gulf. They all made it successfully, even though the "tanker war" has not let up here for even a single day. During this time around 20 peaceful vessels were attacked by the belligerents' aviation and ships.

While still in the Indian Ocean, our crew learned the basics of escorting ships and studied the actions that could be taken to repel an attack on a convoy. Many naval ships have already accumulated such experience.

There were people from whom we could learn. But someone else's experience is not your own. We felt this right away as we were negotiating the Strait of Hormuz. Our first encounter was with a frigate of the Iranian Navy. Would it attack? Everyone was ready—the actions of the Iranians are sometimes unpredictable after all. This time, on identifying our convoy's allegiance it changed its course and steamed towards its own shore.

We had many such encounters after that. And the mine hazard continued to be great in the Gulf. Forty-eight seamen volunteered to serve the mine watch, submitting their applications to the commander. Only six were chosen—they were to be responsible for one of the most important aspects of the ship's defense. Petty Officer 2d Class S. Matyukov, senior seamen R. Abdulayev and Ye. Izhberdiyev and other soldiers standing this special watch, as it is referred to aboard ship, discovered many hazardous objects.

But can it be said that the other kinds of watches on our ship are not special? Take for example combat information post and radar operators. Their chief mission is to detect small launches and other targets from maximum range. The same can also be said for the weapon crew commanders, the signallers and the lookouts. The crew was ready to fight at any moment for the ship's survival,

and to render assistance to any vessel in distress. The most experienced seamen, trained for action under the most complex conditions, were placed in the emergency response groups.

As a result of all of this, our crew passed its test in the Persian Gulf. Imagine how many times we had to block the path of unmarked speedboats to our vessels. What else need be said? We fulfilled the command's assignment. Captain Lieutenant N. Timofeyev, Warrant Officer N. Karp and Chief Petty Officer S. Churkin distinguished themselves especially well, and I could name many other seamen as well.

11004

'Dual Bookkeeping': Staff Out of Touch With Ship's Operations

*18010384 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 May 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by Sr Lt Ye. Tarasov, correspondent of fleet newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA, Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Dual 'Bookkeeping' of the Executive Officer"]

[Text] It should be noted immediately that the executive officer to Guards Capt 3d Rank N. Taskayev, commanding officer of the guards missile cruiser "Varyag" ["Varangian"], is an honorable person. And he needed the dual "bookkeeping" for. . . the benefit of operations: life itself compelled the introduction of two sets of documentation on the ship: for the inspectors and for the work.

"This is not my first year of service," Taskayev explained, "and I had the time to become convinced that not all instructions coming from above on the organization of combat training were constructive. At times, the staff which develops them rarely takes into account the real situation on a specific ship. Nevertheless, a performance report is absolutely required. And so it becomes necessary to extricate oneself somehow. . .

There is no denying that the situation in which Guards Capt 2d Rank N. Taskayev found himself could not be easily classified. However, as can be inferred from conversations with other officers, it is not quite that rare. Indeed, the way out of the difficulty itself, allegedly invented for the "Varyag," to have two sets of documents, alas, is also not new. It is not only on this ship that, trying not to damage relationships with the senior staff, they conduct their own kind of deception and use fictitious documents.

But despite the seriousness of the accusations, let us examine whether those who actively use dual "bookkeeping" are that guilty.

On the day that I was on the "Varyag" preparations were underway to work out the next course problem. What was remarkable was that there was not the usual bustle

that exists in such cases: life on the ship was running smoothly, and activities were being conducted strictly according to the daily routine.

"And if we would do everything that is directed in various regulating documents, telegrams and telephone instructions, you can imagine what would be taking place now on the ship!" remarked Guards Capt 3d Rank Taskayev.

Afterwards we looked at one of these documents. It was drawn up on the principle of a training course for surface ships, and it outlined the procedures for working up elements of the course tasks. But those who drew it up did not take into account the fact that the crews were at different levels of work achievement. Some, let us say, started the training year after a long docking of the ship for repairs and had to begin combat training practically from zero, while others had sailed thousands of miles and had performed much more than one firing exercise. Therefore, the impression was created that for the staff all ships and all crews were much the same.

"That is the way it is!" they prompted me on the "Varyag." "It is much simpler for the staff not to see the differences. Otherwise it would be necessary to work up recommendations for each crew. But this way, there is only one telegram message for everyone. . ."

The staff and ships. . . It was previously thought that there could be no contradiction in this relationship, only harmony: the staff directs and the ship obeys. But it turns out that not everything in the makeup of the existing relationship suits ship crews. And this is probably an objective phenomenon. The staff, of course, is "wiser," by virtue of the fact that the best specialists with experience and considerable practice are assembled there. But it must be assumed that the ship sees its problems better. And superfluous regulation and assigned duties only interfere and stifle initiative.

Much is now being said about independence in resolving internal ship problems. Nobody any longer relies entirely on instructions that govern ship life from "A" to "Z." Restructuring could not help not having an influence on people and their opinions. But old ideas are also still firm. Others want everything to be like in a parade: with straight ranks, uniformity and routine activity. . .

After receiving instructions, as is stated in the course task, the "Varyag" crew gave it some thought. If all of the instructions were to be followed literally, there was not enough time and there were not enough forces. Moreover, the most complex elements could not be completed in a qualitative way. Therefore, after preparing one plan for the staff, (that is to say, in a "report" version), they compiled another one for themselves—a real one by which they began to work. And in the final analysis they achieved the necessary results.

"It can be said that on the whole that we were able to achieve smoothness in the work of all ship elements," asserted Nikolay Borisovich. Dual "bookkeeping" works! But at times the paper barrage is even stronger than it.

For example, this is what happened several months ago. An exercise in the organization of ship work was going on according to plan. And then a telegram arrived from the higher staff with the requirement to immediately conduct a briefing and give tests to the personnel on security measures. Everything had to be interrupted and altered. And in the end a lot was missed.

Figuratively speaking, in his work the executive officer relies on several "whales." These are documents for the new training year, documents on military discipline, accident prevention, personnel work and, finally, current documents on political party work. But in addition to them there are dozens of telephone messages beyond calculation on organizational directives and instructions. And a plan of activities has to be drawn up on each of them, and detailed reporting has to be accomplished. Just to put "completed" in all of the charts, in the words of the executive officer, would take an entire day.

Guards Capt 3d Rank N. Taskayev did not hold back from showing the first such document that came into his hands. It concerned the preparation of personnel for going on a short leave. Several pages of small print typewriter text was taken up by a detailed list of steps and measures which the serviceman, stimulated by the thought of a leave, had to go through. Later on he had to turn in 11 (!) reports.

And I also did not feel quite myself when I considered how much time is needed just to leaf through the documents tightly packed against each other on the shelves. If the executive officer were a pedant, he would succeed in examining and executing only some of them in one day. Once under pressure from above, this had to be done. And later it turned out that the time was spent in vain.

"Today does not quite demonstrate this scheme. It is even surprising, like the quiet before the storm. But I can say from my own experience that we sometimes managed to get through a dozen activities and to please several inspectors. I am still keeping many plans and documents from last year. A lot of time was spent on their formulation. You see if any of them would be useful in the new training year," the Guards Capt 3d Rank said in sharing one of his secrets of dual "bookkeeping."

At the end of the conversation, the executive officer turned my attention to a typical daily routine. It was developed by the staff of a unit of surface ships in which there was a guards cruiser. Activities were planned in such a way that there was not even a 5-minute break

between them. Really, one can only be amazed how they succeed in functioning from minute to minute on a ship with this routine. The executive officer also had his opinion on this account.

“In its existing form, the weekly routine is formality of the first water. It is physically impossible to pack everything in in the time allotted by them. But this formality has to be tolerated, because it is mandatory that it be executed.”

So, what is dual “bookkeeping?” In my opinion, the reason for its appearance is quite simple. It is a kind of protest against outdated forms of control. Even if timid, it marks the direction in which changes have to occur in the future—when the independent plans that are drawn up on a ship will not be hidden from inspectors. When it will be possible to work with them openly.

13052

Flaws in Construction Planning

18010381a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Maj G. Kulinich, engineer-inspector, financial service, Belorussian Military District: "From the Design to the Object"]

[Text] I would be so bold as to assert that things are not going on for builders as well as they should, in many ways due to the existing procedures for coordinating and approving designs and estimates.

Judge for yourself. First the designers submit their product to the client, and he does so to the contractor. The latter examines the designs and estimates over a 45-day period, and then sends them back together with his remarks and conclusions for coordination within a 10-day period. If disagreements arise, the decision is made by a higher authority within 20 days. After this, the client instructs the designer to incorporate the remarks in the designs and estimates within one month. Thus the contractor design takes a "journey" of around 100 days—and much more sometimes in real life.

For example the design and estimate for a 75-unit apartment building under construction by subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel G. Zherdetskiy wandered around for 10 months. Documents for the heating network of another residential building did so for a slightly shorter period. Two years ago I personally came across a work superintended who never saw an estimate before the end of construction of a certain facility.

What do such practices lead to? Let us assume that builders receive the entire set of approved documents in August, and that they make the residential building ready for use in September. Consequently all of the paperwork essentially turns out to be unnecessary, and still the design organization submits a bill—and not a small one at that, since the quality of the design is high and it was completed before the deadline. Designers are not troubled much today by whether or not mistakes are corrected, inconsistencies in the documents are resolved, and the contractor receives them before construction begins.

Moreover it is no secret to anyone that unfinished work or, still worse, glaring errors by the designers are often revealed during construction of an installation. And attempts to correct them are sometimes met with stubborn resistance. I recall a case where builders working on a certain installation suggested laying the utility lines in two rows of reinforced concrete troughs rather than in the four foreseen by the design. But the idea was met with fixed bayonets. The efficiency experts had to appeal to the technical directorate of capital construction of the USSR Ministry of Defense. There the suggestion was deemed suitable, and its economic impact was assessed at 1.7 million rubles.

Here is another example. During inspection of a construction site under Colonel Yu. Krivonogov's supervision at that time, the district's financial service revealed an "insignificant" irregularity in the design and estimate documents. Simple arithmetic showed that it could have inflated the cost of construction by 750,000 rubles. The designers admitted to their mistake and came up with a new estimate that accounted for the remarks, but even so, they did manage to pocket 22,000 rubles—the bonus for high design quality. Other mistakes made by various design organizations can be cited as well. I think that part of the bonus for a high quality design product should not be paid out until the installation, or a certain phase of it, is ready.

Now about the monitoring system. What happens? An estimate for construction of a facility is drawn up by the engineers of one design organization, then it is checked out by specialists who tailor the standard design to the specific conditions, and after that the documents go to the contractor, the client, the expert group and the district's financial service. Is such monitoring really effective? No. That the estimate must go through so many checks appears to be a good thing only at first glance: Not one of the checkers is interested in reducing the estimated cost of the design. Why is it, for example, that the engineer-inspector of the housing operations directorate and the contractor bear material liability for estimate padding, while the designer is practically immune? I feel that all of the listed irregularities could be avoided by uniting the builders with the designers. As an example we could reorganize the district's design organizations as design and estimate divisions of construction directorates. This would sharply reduce the time it takes to prepare the documents and orient the designers on the end result—the fastest possible placement of facilities into operation.

Estimates show that just in our district alone, such reorganization would make it possible to reduce the staff of the military design directorate and the construction directorate by several dozen persons, and save up to 70,000 rubles in the annual wage fund. After all these two organizations contain two chiefs, two chief accountants, two archives, two libraries and two assistant managers. In the end, an entire detachment of assessors representing the builders check the work of the military designer's assessors.

I know that some design organization executives will argue against this innovation. But isn't it time to subordinate departmental interests and personal ambition to the common good?

**Deputy Directorate Chief on State of Military
Medicine After Afghanistan**
*18010373 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by Maj Gen Medical Service P. Vyazitskiy, chief, preventive medicine directorate, and deputy chief, Central Military Medical Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "The Military Doctor"]

[Text] Petr Osipovich Vyazitskiy donned the shoulder-boards of a military doctor in 1954, after completing the military medical faculty at the Kuybyshev Medical Institute. He served six years as a military doctor. Then followed studies at the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, and the path from senior intern to senior academy instructor. He was the chief therapist in Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, a faculty chief at the academy, and deputy chief of the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N. N. Burdenko for medical matters. In short, he has great experience in both practical and scientific work. Today Maj Gen Medical Service P. Vyazitskiy, professor, doctor of medical sciences, and bearer of the USSR State Prize, reflects on the place and role of the military doctor, and on increasing his authority in the forces and fleets.

Recently I returned from Afghanistan. I saw once again how military doctors are carrying out their very hard work there, and what skill and courage the situation demands of them. Frequently I heard from commanders that if they just succeed in getting the wounded person to the hospital, to the operating table, there the military medical personnel will pull him through, and do everything possible and impossible. By the way, medical personnel are also performing courageously and ably right in the combat formations. Capt Medical Service Vladimir Kachanskiy was in the heat of combat operations 26 times. Repeatedly someone's life depended on his professionalism and cool-headedness. Once he personally pulled nine wounded soldiers from under fire, rendered first aid on the spot, and himself received a concussion. The officer earned the medal, "For Valor."

Again and again our military doctors are proving on Afghan soil that they are worthy of the glory of medical personnel of the times of the Great Patriotic War. They are the same models of skill, bravery and self-sacrifice. They have the same strength of spirit. I recall Sr Lt Medical Service Sergey Viberg, who covered a soldier with his body, just as at one time front line medical personnel covered the wounded from bullets and shell fragments with their bodies as they carried them from the battlefield. I recall Col Medical Service Ivan Danilovich Kosachev, who earned the highest award of the homeland, the Order of Lenin, for heroism in fulfilling his international duty. For several years Ivan Danilovich was the chief surgeon of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Today he is instructing in the academy, but legends about Kosachev circulate in Afghanistan even to this day. Even in those instances

when, according to all the canons of military field surgery, a man was considered hopeless, this talented surgeon, as a rule, came through the victor.

Each of these people, who came into military medicine through a calling, at the command of their heart, fulfilled and is fulfilling both his medical and his military duty with honor. Recently I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about Valerii Vostrotin, a guards lieutenant colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union. Twice he was seriously wounded and received concussions. What dream could there be about his return to duty? But Vostrotin returned to his home regiment. He is, undoubtedly, a man of tremendous strength of will. But the art of medical personnel at the Kabul and Tashkent military hospitals and the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, also plays its important role.

High professional skill, a feeling of responsibility and duty, and party principle are indisputable traits of the moral demeanor of the majority of military doctors. Not only Afghanistan, but also Chernobyl, and numerous other events showed this, when in extreme situations the military doctor performed admirably.

Needless to say, I am far from complacent. We know how many problems are today facing the military medical service. We recognize that medicine itself also requires improvement. Everyone knows the resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on restructuring of health, which decrees specific, real deeds to improve health protection. Success will depend largely also on the attitude of medical personnel toward their duties, their positions, and an innovative approach to their work.

We say that a military doctor is always in war. This is not a catch-word. A man with medical emblems on his shoulder-boards is always obligated to be at full combat readiness, whether he operates under the whines of bullets overhead, or serves in the taiga, the desert, or on the ocean. But, good-for-nothing medical personnel have still not been gotten rid of. Cases of neglect, irresponsibility, and callousness on the part of military doctors are known.

We react with particular intolerance toward instances of indifference, and callousness sometimes displayed toward soldier-internationalists who are being treated at our medical institutions. Unfortunately, such inattention at times exists. I can now, of course, explain this in terms of the lack of junior medical personnel (a "sickness" that is common to our public health care, and has not bypassed military medicine), and by such other causes. However, I believe that it is not only a matter of this. Let us be frank. Saving the life of a soldier, and removing a threat to his health, some medical personnel at times slacken ordinary human attention toward the

sick or wounded patient. And this is absolutely impermissible. A soldier being given medical treatment requires constant concern and honest, good-willed participation of the military doctor in his fate all the way to his discharge.

No so long ago I witnessed this event. A man became ill while riding on an electric train. Illness, we know, does not choose either the hour or the place. A major of medical service was nearby. But he did not come to the aid, but hastened to leave the train car. The medical officer disregarded both his duty and medical ethics. The behavior of such doctors is immoral. It also has a bad effect on the authority of those who sacredly fulfill their duty.

Fortunately this is not a typical case. Life gives us many examples of another sort, when the doctor takes recognized risk, gives his own blood, tests the latest medicine on himself, and spends nights at the beds of the patients. The names of many military doctors are known throughout the country. I always recall my studies in the academy with a special feeling. I recall my mentors, medical scholars P. Kupriyanov, N. Molchanov, V. Beyyer... I must say that academic schools were always original and progressive. But today we are somehow losing our tradition and the spirit of originality has also disappeared. What is the reason for this? In my opinion, we were attracted by statistics, counts of the numbers of doctors and hospitals, and set our hopes on the extensive path of development of medicine, including military medicine, for too long a period of time, and consistently avoided acute problems. And we did not notice as we began to let the main ingredient, the person, slip from our attention. Leveling has also played its unsightly role. Up to now, let us say, the work of a surgeon in a major hospital, and a surgeon in a small polyclinic is recompensed identically, although it is clear that the amount and nature of the work differ. Is this not one of the reasons that today the interests of future doctors in such difficult fields of medicine as surgery and anesthesiology has noticeably declined? There are very few people at all who desire to go into microsurgery, which is associated with many hours of heroic operations. Military medical science is under the same condition. Like public health as a whole, it has been "going" on people's enthusiasm for many years. We are, of course, posing these questions today. I think that in the near future the situation will change. It must change.

Who is entering into military medicine today? Who are we preparing for service? The competition for the military medical academy remains high as before: 8-10 people per opening. How can we choose from these the people who are worthy and dedicated to medicine? After all, a mistake in the competitive selection is both an unjustified expenditure of state funds, and in the future, possibly, someone's misfortune. Another problem is that the future doctor waits too long to encounter practical medicine in the forces and the fleets, with the clinic, and with the patients. Today we are thinking about how to solve this problem, and are taking specific steps. The shortage of practical skills has a negative affect on the authority of the military doctor, especially at the time he is beginning his duty. Meanwhile, arriving at his place of service, the military settlement, he simply must be a "jack of all trades." He must engage not only in preventive medicine and the struggle for a healthy way of life, but in literally everything, beginning with treating traumas and poisonings, and ending with children's illnesses.

The topic of military medicine and the authority of the military doctor are special. It is this that today requires the closest attention, both from the leaders of the medical service, and from commanders and political officers. Everyone knows that health is an important factor in combat readiness. But numerous examples are also known, when officials commit gross violations, both in the organization of feeding, in the bath and laundry service, and in other questions of everyday life. Or they close their eyes to the reports by medical personnel on shortcomings influencing the health of personnel, on epidemiological wellbeing in the unit, and do not take energetic practical steps and support the doctor in his struggle for a healthy way of life of the soldiers.

Yes, the task of military medicine is, in principle, not to permit illness. But this is a common task also of commanders, political officers, and chiefs of various services. The military medical man must understand well that he is in a closed collective, and the patient cannot choose another doctor for himself. And the attitudes between him and the soldier must be of the greatest trust. Today good conditions have been created for the successful work of the military doctor. I have in mind both the material base and medical support. But, it is also necessary not to forget about self-education. Medicine does not stand in one place. From my own experience I know that if a man does not go through the school of military medicine, and does not obtain extensive general medical training in the forces and the fleets, it is doubtful he will be a high class category specialist.

Units, Schools Prohibited From Purchase of Computers

18010378a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by the Naval Combat Training Department of the Editor's Office: "Pooling Resources to Get a Computer"]

[Text] Any article carried by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that raises the problems of using computers in combat training evokes numerous responses. This mail can be divided into two parts. The first contains proposals, while the second contains fully pertinent questions: How can we ever get our hands on them, these computers, if they reach the troops and the fleets in such limited quantities?

Letters from readers concerning the article "The Unattainable Computer" by Senior Lieutenant Ye. Tarasov, published 21 January, are no exception. Let us recall one of the problems examined by the author. When it comes to submarines, many of the training offices are equipped with obsolete instruments. They are no longer used aboard ship, but for some reason the training has to be done with them. On the other hand not that long ago a personal computer that could be used to solve navigation problems was offered for sale to the submariners. But they were never purchased—the financial experts objected. Strictly speaking they were in the right, there were certain documents that supported their objections, even though they were 15 years old.

"Might I hope that competent organizations will in the end resolve this issue?" the author asks. "If you think about it, nothing will come of all of this. It's not that easy to change even obsolete instructions. But I do support the newspaper's stand: Universal computer literacy can't be achieved without computers," Warrant Officer N. Lankovets came close to predicting the subsequent course of events.

Here are excerpts from the reply by Colonel I. Radutnyy, chief of the Pacific Fleet's Financial Service: "The article's author correctly asserts that the marketing network offers these goods for sale, but the following prohibitions on their purchase exist:

"1. Military units, services and military educational institutions are prohibited from using money to pay from computers supplied centrally on the basis of approved tables of equipment and supply norms.

"2. The purchase of miniature calculators, computers and felt-tip pens is not foreseen by the USSR Ministry of Defense's budget.

"...But even if the money were allocated, it would be impossible to purchase computers because the marketing network can sell felt-tip pens, miniature calculators and personal computers (the latter were available at a price of

650 rubles) only to the public at large, and it refuses to do so to military units, enterprises and services in light of the 'Rules of Sale of Marketable Goods to Institutions, Organizations, Enterprises and Kolkhozes on a Minor Wholesale Basis,' approved by the USSR Ministry of Trade and the USSR Gosbank on 1 August 1977...and supplemented by a letter from this ministry and the governing board of the USSR Gosbank dated 10 June 1980...."

As we can see, the editor's office was essentially unable to establish a dialogue with one of the naval departments. There was but one answer: It is not permitted, and that's final. But if life insists, then the appropriate officials should sweep this "it is not permitted" from the path of progress. So far, the initiative is coming only from below. Cadet Ya. Ivanko from the Kiev Higher Engineer Radiotechnical School of Air Defense Forces imeni Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin, for example, is prepared to share his experience with submariners. "We have been using personal computers in our training for over a year now," he writes the editor's office. "They have extensive graphics capability, and this allows them to work not only with numerical data but also with graphical information. I think that they can be used to solve navigation problems as well. It is easy to create any combat and training programs with computers." All that is left to be said is that even in this school, the only kind of support that is available is that which comes from the enthusiasm of the students. All of the computers available to the cadets were purchased with their own money. If they were to follow this route, the submariners would have to pool their own resources to get the computers. And what do competent organizations feel about all of this? The question raised in "The Unattainable Computer" remains open.

11004

Readers' Discussion on Reform of Military Education Continues

The Reputation of Education

18010353a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Yu. Yerokhin, doctor of technical sciences and professor, under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion—The Military Teacher. What Should He Be?": "The Reputation of Education"]

[Text] On March 1, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Doctor of Military Sciences Col Ye. Zhuravlev under this title. It evoked the interest of readers, and replies began coming in to the editors whose authors propose to continue the discussion of this topic, expressing their opinions and constructive suggestions. Today we are publishing two of the replies received.

As practice has shown, the reform of military schooling that was carried out in the 1970s has unfortunately not had the anticipated results. The academic level of the instructor personnel at a number of higher military schools remains too low, which is having an effect on the training of graduates, especially those in technical fields.

It seems expedient in this regard to expand the curriculum of basic academic disciplines offered at the technical military higher educational institutions (physics and mathematics, theoretical mechanics, the theoretical foundations of electrical and radio equipment, theory of automatic regulation etc.) to the amount covered, for example, at MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical School imeni N.E. Bauman], MFTI [Moscow Physiotchnical Institute], MAI [Moscow Aviation Institute imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze] and others. This would make it possible to raise the level of training of graduating officers and will facilitate their deeper study of arms and military equipment and an understanding of the physical processes transpiring in contemporary complex apparatus. This will naturally require raising the qualifications of the military pedagogical personnel.

It seems that the practice of assigning the graduates of military academies and institutes that have displayed an inclination for academic work in the course of their studies to the NIUs or the training grounds should be more widespread. It would be expedient to assign the graduates of civilian higher educational institutions in those fields for which training is not done in the military institutions to these establishments as well. Supplementing the detachment of academic workers is also facilitated by the practice of sending university and higher educational institution graduates to the engineering academies for training in research groups. All of this will make it possible, in my opinion, to raise the creative potential of our scientific-research institutions.

It seems expedient, in order to improve the training of specialists of the highest qualifications, to increase graduate work at the NIUs, even, perhaps, partly through the graduate work of the higher educational institutions. The academic collectives consist basically of staff members with much military experience that are constantly carrying out the military and technical support of weaponry in the units and formations and are able to provide academic leadership with a regard for contemporary requirements.

Experience in working as part of an expert council of the Higher Certification Commission shows that the dissertation work of the graduate students and competitors from the NIUs and the training grounds is closely linked with the needs of the troops and their technical outfitting. The absolute majority of the conclusions of these dissertations are incarnated in concrete forms of weapons and combat equipment and is used in the practical activity of the troops.

It seems expedient to me to develop steps to expand the network of teaching councils at the training grounds along with incentives for the work of academic supervisors. We should probably also think some about awarding a higher rank by one to actively working doctors of sciences. No less important, in my opinion, is the more complete utilization of the capabilities of specialists with higher qualifications. The NIUs frequently part ways with highly certified teachers at the age of 45-50, during their most fruitful work periods.

The way to reduce the average age of academy graduates is accepting the graduates of secondary schools into the military engineering academies, as was done in the 1950s. The experience of those years confirms that in the overwhelming majority of cases, they became skilled and highly erudite military engineers, and many received the degree of candidate or doctor of sciences.

The aforementioned suggestions naturally do not exhaust all of the questions associated with restructuring the system for training specialists with higher qualifications, but it is indisputable, in my opinion, that the times demand their solution. As early as at the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, it was noted that "the Central Committee is counting firmly on the army personnel and the Soviet officer corps to accomplish the mission of reinforcing the defensive capability of the state..." Well-trained officers with profound academic knowledge are essential to the fulfillment of this mission.

Spirit of the Times

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Dudnik, candidate of pedagogical sciences, head of the party political work department of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion—The Military Teacher. What Should He Be?": "Acting in the Spirit of the Times"]

[Text] In my opinion, Col Ye. Zhuravlev has revealed one of the sore spots of military science and has proposed an original model for escaping this distinctive dead-end. But this model seems to me of a localized nature, since it concerns just the problem of training military teachers. It seems that it could hardly be resolved outside the context of training personnel overall. We live in an era of radical and constructive reforms. The time for them has evidently come in the realm of our military education as well. It is hardly possible to consider the existing situation in the universal higher education of military personnel today to be correct. The "receipt" of higher education at the academies right away (without preliminary secondary education and professional work experience) essentially devalues it. Practice shows that a quality secondary military education with a good practical bent and the skills acquired by being in the ranks are completely adequate up to the battalion level. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already

approached this problem. The conditions apparently were not ripe at the time, and there was no detailed discussion. And the issue was training tactical-level military specialists for three years rather than five.

Today we have many arguments in favor of such a solution. This makes the training of personnel much cheaper, accelerates the departure of the young man from the student's desk to practical work and simplifies subsequent professional re-orientation (which is practically ruled out today). Having finished the academy at 20 or 21 years of age, the young officer succeeds anywhere, and he is not too old for deeper classes in the sciences.

The idea itself is tempting. The proposed model for the early selection of military teachers and researchers, however, has drawbacks as well. In the event it is realized, the possibility of coming to a higher military school, including in the sciences, is cut off for older officers that have completed a multivaried "shaping" in practice. On the one hand, this is fair, but on the other, army experience is extremely important for establishing oneself in military science. That is why it seems expedient to formulate such a situation where the possibility of selection to the ranks of military teachers and researchers would coincide logically at all stages: after the military institute, right after the military academy, from practical work in the ranks.

One model—early selection from the institutes—has been proposed by the author of the article. Selections could also be made in roughly the same way right after the academic course.

But the discussion so far has concerned just the organizational form. How to ensure suitable quality? The key here is early specialization with a reliance on the inclinations and interests of the students. And this, in my opinion, is a different and more important aspect of the issue.

The existing system (organizationally and in evaluations) does not create conditions for the early specialization of the cadet and student. He has no time limit or essential criteria for evaluation for this. A time limit could be created by offering the most creative individuals an individual plan of study after the completion of a certain curriculum. But will this individual, having studied his field more deeply and even obtained creative results, be able to be given a diploma with which he will then be able to complete the academy, graduate work

etc.? An "A" for the whole academic course is needed for a "red" diploma, and the more so for a medal. The stereotype of "average" success must be broken. The question is—how?

Some researchers propose delineating three levels of mastery of academic disciplines: creative, applied and general-educational. If every military higher educational institution (in the departments) has a list of specialized disciplines which the cadet (student) has the right to select from to study on a creative level, the same sort of list for applied studies and general-educational studies, and then the evaluations received are converted to a scale of values maximally possible by the end of studies, plus some additional special requirements (in the form of course, diploma, academic, competitive and other work and the results of internships in the ranks), then the students and, if can be expressed in such a manner, the academic disciplines they study will prove to be on an equal footing.

In other words, a student preparing himself for instruction and academic work will concentrate on a profound study of several subjects, obtaining high grades in them, to which are added evaluations for creative accomplishments in other disciplines as well, on an equal footing with those of his colleagues who have chosen the field of creative interests of other sciences and other academic disciplines along with those who divide their talents equally among all subjects, preparing themselves for work in the ranks. The diplomas, regardless of the differing evaluations for different subjects, are the same for each of them—"red"—since each of them has accumulated the same total of points. The quality of specialists' training, however, is not the same, but rather differentiated, making it possible to uncover truly talented officers who gravitate toward science.

The recognition of individual curricula poses another question: the possibility of the parallel receipt of education in two or three departments. Which is worse: a specialist in the realm of party political work with a basic philosophical education or a philosopher with base training in party history? This has not been developed organizationally, however.

Naturally, just basic methodological questions have been set forth herein. Each of them should take the form of a concrete conception.

Finnish-Soviet History Seminar To Re-Examine Winter War

Finnish Scholars Cite 'Gaps'

36170069 Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* in Finnish
15 May 88 p A3, B1-2

[Article by Matti Klemola]

[Text] Finnish historians will get an opportunity to express their views on the Winter War and its causes when Soviet and Finnish historians meet at a symposium in Moscow a year and a half from now.

Soviet historiography has thus far claimed that Finland was to blame for the Winter War and even initiated it.

The Finnish-Soviet symposium is scheduled to be held in the autumn of 1989. The symposium's topic is "The security question in Europe in the late 1930's and Finnish-Soviet relations."

According to Timo Vihavainen, who teaches East European history at Helsinki University, the atmosphere is such that it will be impossible to avoid discussing the Winter War.

Recently there have been hints that the Winter War—a sore spot in the common, but differently written, histories of Finland and the Soviet Union—is being interpreted by the Soviets in a new way.

Does the "new political culture" called for by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev also mean that Finland's status and substance are changing in Soviet historiography? At least there is hope.

In the autumn of 1989 Moscow plans to hold a symposium for Finnish and Soviet historians which will deal with European security in the late 1930's. The atmosphere is such that the Winter War cannot be avoided.

For example, in the final volume of memoirs by the late Konstantin Simonov, a well-known military historian, the Soviet Union appears surprisingly as the aggressor in the Winter War. The Soviet Union has thus far claimed that Finland provoked the "conflict" in a frenzy of hate.

Timo Vihavainen, who teaches East European history at Helsinki University, says that there are familiar features in this reassessment of Soviet history: the situation in Finland was somewhat similar in the 1950's and 1960's.

Taboos are broken almost weekly in the Soviet Union. Andrei Zhdanov, who belonged to dictator Joseph Stalin's inner circle, was branded an executioner a few days ago in the paper *OGONJOK*. Zhdanov served as director of the Allies' supervisory commission in Finland from 1944 to 1947.

"Vaino Linna's 'Tuntematon sotilas' [The Unknown Soldier] and Paavo Rintala's 'Sissiluutnantti' [The Partisan Lieutenant], as well as studies that revealed the terror of the civil war, filled the 'white gaps' in our own history. Here, too, opposition was fierce: you were only supposed to speak in a positive spirit about positive things.

"The starting points of Soviet historiography are so different, however, that comparison with Finland is not a good idea. In its historiography, the Soviet Union has always been in the right: it has acted exclusively in accordance with humane and progressive principles. Yet based on research, Finns have written how things went wrong now and then," says Vihavainen.

Great Hate or Great Friendship?

When the peculiar features of Finland's image were sifted out of Soviet historical writing and historical concepts, even the names of events are different. Historians know that the Winter War was a "conflict," the "Soviet-Finnish war," or in brief "Finland's war." The Great Hate (1713-21), the Russian occupation of Finland during the Great Northern War, was described as "the great friendship" at one symposium. This argument was based on the judgement that the atrocities committed during the Great Hate were not all that bad.

"That doesn't justify the 'great friendship' interpretation," says Vihavainen.

Finnish and Soviet historians do not even agree on how the Finns' Russophobia originated. Old Russian historiography recounts that Finns fomented a Russophobia without any grounds. Lenin, for his part, said the czar had persecuted the Finns and aroused their justified hate. However, the current Soviet view is that during the period of autonomy Finland sponged off the Soviet Union and enjoyed its privileges unscrupulously. Only the middle class fomented hatred of another nation for the sake of its own goals.

Timo Vihavainen is also ready to admit that during the time of autonomy Finns were haughty and disdainful. This attitude led to oppressive measures by the Russians and engendered bad feelings between the two peoples.

"Real Russophobia was not fomented until after independence. The incitement was mutual, however. In particular, Finnish emigrants who fled to the Soviet Union after the civil war stirred up hatred of White Finland."

The worse disagreements of Finnish and Soviet historiography begin with Finland's becoming independent. Even the Soviet interpretation of the Russian soldiers' role in the civil war is strange.

Soviet historiographers claim that the Soviet government gave military aid to Red Finland, but in practically the same breath they recount how Soviet Russia remained neutral when the civil war began.

"The writers of history seem to have forgotten that Soviet Russian wouldn't have been able to assemble enough troops to significantly affect the battle between Finnish Reds and Whites."

Another very controversial point concerns the recognition of Finnish independence. The Soviets say Lenin "gave" Finland its independence.

Finland had already declared itself independent on 6 December 1917, however, and only asked for recognition by the Soviet government. It did not come until 31 December 1917.

"In the end, it was a very routine affair. Why shouldn't the new Soviet government recognize Finland when it had already supported Finnish independence and didn't even have the power to prevent Finland from becoming independent?"

The period (1917-20) between Finland's independence and the Peace of Tartu is also interpreted very differently. According to Soviet historians, an ungrateful Finland was merely a Western hireling watching for an opportunity to stick a knife in the back of the young Soviet state. During the 1920 Peace of Tartu negotiations, too, in the opinion of Soviet Russia, Finland was seen as the Western states' errand boy: it coveted territory which did not belong to it.

"It's true that in the Soviet Union the view has been introduced that during those years Finland contented itself with mere pinpricks, which is true, but according to official explanations Finland was a puppet of the imperialists," reveals Vihavainen.

Finnish-Soviet relations were marked by the bad feelings of the 1920's and 1930's, which culminated in the Winter War in November 1939. Finland was branded a belligerent and dangerous neighbor in which the always untrustworthy Social Democrats—along with rightist powers—bustled about.

"Soviet historiography's image of Finland at that time is merely a long list of sins. But claims of Finnish military preparations in the years 1928 to 1931, for example, resulted from the Soviet Union's own problems.

"The Soviet economy was then undergoing forced collectivization. Industrialization advanced at a rapid pace. Because stringent measures were employed, it was important to claim that the country was always in danger of getting into a war.

"When no one could really figure out who the enemy was, France was chosen as the scapegoat. Acting as its henchmen were Poland, Romania, Finland, and the small Baltic states. Soviet historiography says that anti-Soviet hysteria ruled in Finland at that time, which is partly true: after all, we had the Lapua movement. The hysteria began with the Soviet Union, however, and the Lapua movement was basically a reaction to it."

To the surprise of the Soviet Union, the Finnish Government outlawed the ultranationalistic and ultraconservative Lapua movement and signed a nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union in 1932.

The agreement did not warm up the countries' relations for long, because Stalin's massive purges began in 1937. Again, enemies had to be found everywhere.

The Finns of East Karelia were also condemned as pawns of the fascists. A lot of heads fell. Timo Vihavainen says that the situation in the Soviet Union was miserable and chaotic. It tried to be the ally of democratically ruled countries, but Finns knew that mass terror was being practiced in the Soviet Union. There was no temptation to broaden relations.

Neighbors' Road To War

When the Social Democrats came to power again in 1937 after a 10-year hiatus, the Soviet Union's view was that Finnish affairs were in good working order. Otto-Ville Kuusinen, the most influential Finnish communist in exile, wrote in the summer of 1939 that Finland was becoming more democratic, but he also called on Finland to abandon its neutrality: an alliance with the Soviet Union was inevitable because Finland would not be able to defend its territory.

"Soviet historiography from that time on is full of surprises. Right up until the autumn of 1939, Finland was viewed as Germany's henchman, but suddenly Finland became a helper of the Western states. Germany was no longer mentioned," says Vihavainen.

This sudden turn resulted from the Nonaggression Pact signed by Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. In a separate secret protocol, Germany gave the Soviet Union a free hand to do whatever it wanted with Finland.

Soviet historiography sees the pact as a mere tactic. The Soviet Union "knew" that Germany would still attack, and Stalin therefore wanted to win some time.

The Soviet Union has never admitted there was a separate secret protocol.

Soviet historiography prepares the ground for the Winter War by accusing militant Finland of plotting with Western states against the Soviet Union.

The history of the Winter War—the Terijoki government of Otto-Ville Kuusinen, the so-called Mainila shots by which Finland was said to have provoked the war, as well as the nature and course of the confrontation—is written in the Soviet Union quite differently from the way it is in Finland. The Terijoki government, or the “legal government” of Finland imposed by Stalin, is completely forgotten afterwards. Still heard, on the other hand, is the rumble of the “Mainila shots” claimed to have been fired by Finns.

Timo Vihavainen considers it especially heavyhanded that the Soviet attribute the cause of the Winter War to upcoming events such as the German attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941.

“Use of such a method isn’t scientific, but something quite different,” he says.

According to Vihavainen, the Soviets need to reassess the history of both the Winter War and the Continuation War. For example, the Soviet Union has not revealed precise figures of casualties. On the other hand, Finnish casualties have been exaggerated enormously.

In fact, the Soviet Union has still not revealed anything about its WWII casualties other than the total number, 20 million, half of whom were civilians.

Nor did the Soviets bomb civilian targets in Finland such as Helsinki. Instead, Soviet pilots were “very humane.”

“It is claimed, for instance, that when pilots bombed power plants during the Winter War, they destroyed only conduits leading to the front. Some Soviet colleagues are even now amazed when they are shown scars, left by fragments of bombs, visible at the pedestal of Snellman’s statue,” says Vihavainen.

Of course, Soviet historians see Finland during the Continuation War as an ally of Germany. There is no talk about a war of revenge because the Soviet Union, after all, offered Finland a “generous” peace in March 1940.

The major battles on the Karelian Isthmus are summed up, according to Vihavainen, by stating briefly that the Red Army did its job, then rushed off to beat Germany. In reality, the biggest and bloodiest battles in Finnish military history were waged on the Karelian Isthmus.

True Independence Not Achieved Until 1948

As written by Soviets, Finnish history from 1917 to the 1944 truce is the tale of a bellicose, untrustworthy, and stubborn neighbor whose government pursued an anti-democratic policy.

The Soviet Union tried untiringly to be a good neighbor to such a country, too, but by way of thanks Finland started a war in 1939.

“The Winter War and all its events are easily the biggest gap in the Soviet history of Finland,” says Timo Vihavainen.

When Soviet historiography leaves the impression that not until 1948—after the truce, the Paris peace agreement, the condemnation of “war criminals,” and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance—did Finland become an authentically independent state, politically and economically, then the countries’ historians still have a lot to talk about.

Finland as Friend and Enemy

V. Pohlebkina has written the best known introduction to the common history of Finland, Russia, and, later, the Soviet Union. “Suomi ystävänä ja vihollisena” [Finland as Friend and Enemy] was published in Finland in 1969. The following are excerpts from Pohlebkina’s work:

At exactly midnight on 31 December 1917, the Soviet government signed a resolution recognizing Finland’s independence. It was Soviet Russia’s New Year’s gift to the Finnish people. By granting Finland its independence, the Soviet government assumed it had laid a firm foundation for future Soviet-Finnish relations.

This third stage (1930-1939) of Finland’s anti-Soviet attitude, which clearly paved the way for the Winter War, increased Soviet distrust of Finland’s political leaders and exacerbated the lack of understanding between both countries. How could it be otherwise when the Soviet government happened to be an eyewitness to the development of Finland’s domestic and foreign policies?

There was no hope left for peace. When the Finnish government refused to withdraw its troops 20-25 kilometers from the border and the skirmishes did not cease, the Soviet government could wait no longer: on 28 November 1939, it abrogated the nonaggression agreement, and on November 29 called its diplomatic and commercial representatives home from Helsinki. The series of events which followed led to the outbreak of military conflict between the neighboring countries. The war which the Soviet government had devoted so much effort at preventing became a fact.

The Soviet Union has never waged war against the Finnish people. Its goal was not and could not be the violation of Finland’s independence and national rights. The battle was waged against fascism, against the reactionary forces which pushed Finland and its people into the maelstrom of war.

A Soviet observer is amazed by the imposing number of memoirs, literary works, and historical volumes dealing with the Winter War which have appeared in Finland since World War II.

Simonov Memoirs Viewed

36170069 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish
15 May 88 p A15Y

[Commentary by Helge Seppala, military historian from Vantaa]

[Text] The final volume of former war correspondent and military writer Konstantin Simonov's posthumous memoirs in the Moscow journal ZNAMJA has perhaps received too much attention in the press and television news.

In the final volume of the memoirs, Soviet Marshal A. M. Vasilevski's appraisal of the Winter War—as told to the author—is offered.

A television news reporter suggested on the evening of May 7 that this is the first time Soviet sources have admitted the Soviet Union initiated the Winter War. He assumed that up until now our neighbor has blamed Finland for starting the war by firing the Mainila shots.

The news reporter pressed Colonel Matti Lappalainen, director of the Military Science Institute, for his opinion on the same topic. Lappalainen finally admitted that this was the first time.

Lauri Haataja, a political scientist, also stated in a May 9 article in HELSINGIN SANOMAT, entitled "Major Disclosures in Filling Gaps of Winter War," that for the first time the Soviet Union has publicly expressed the view that it had initiated the Winter War.

In my book "Taistelu Leningradista ja Suomi" [Finland and the Battle for Leningrad], I quoted the following message, among others, from the official Russian-language work "The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War," which was written by a working group headed by P. N. Pospelov and issued by the military publishing house of the USSR Defense Ministry:

"Many times the Soviet government offered to settle the border question on terms acceptable to Finland, but Finnish reactionaries had other dreams. Finland's military preparations clearly showed that the country did not want a peaceful solution to the disputed matter but instead deliberately aggravated the situation and moved toward armed conflict. As a result, Finnish artillery fired on Soviet territory. It was quite obvious that the Finnish government hoped for help from abroad. This forced the Soviet government to abrogate the nonaggression agreement on 28 November 1939 and break diplomatic relations with Finland. Finnish warmongers responded to this with new provocations in the Leningrad area. In the

deteriorating situation, the Soviet government was forced to order Leningrad district troops to destroy the Finns' military bridgehead on the Karelian Isthmus. Military operations between Finland and the Soviet Union began on November 30.

"The issue would not have led to military conflict between the two countries if the Finnish government had not pursued a policy which rejected the genuine national interests of our peoples and if it had properly understood the reasons which compelled the Soviet government to raise the question of shifting the border on the Karelian Isthmus."

The quoted passage may clearly demonstrate that the Soviet Union started the war precisely because the Finnish government did not agree to territorial concessions. Nothing is said about the Mainila shots. Artillery fire and provocations are mentioned only as formal arguments to the Russian people.

Published in 1974, the official history of the Leningrad military district states that even before the war began, the Soviet government had taken steps to protect the northwest quarter by deploying the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus. Upon orders from the Red Army Supreme Command, the Leningrad military district concentrated its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, and starting December 9 the headquarters of the Red Army Supreme Command was made responsible for directing military operations against Finland. All those measures were based, naturally, on Stalin's orders.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT's striking headline on May 7, "Winter War Great Disgrace to USSR," is nothing new as such. In Marshal Vasilevski's memoirs, published in 1973 and translated into Finnish in Moscow in 1978, it is noted that Stalin realized the Soviet Union a loss of prestige, which Stalin also explained to Chief of Staff B. Shaposhnikov when he relieved the latter of his duties.

The turning point suggested by Simonov conforms in many respects with that in Vasilevski's memoirs. On the other hand, Vasilevski writes about the Mainila shots.

The Winter War has been and is a sensitive issue for the Soviet Union because it revealed the Red Army's unpreparedness and mistakes, which Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov wrote about in "The History of Scientific Warfare," published in 1963.

In the Soviet Union little has been written about the Winter War, but enough to indicate that some time back Soviet sources revealed who had initiated the war.

You just have to understand the style of our neighboring country's historiography. The news items and issues now presented show how superficially we know the USSR's political and military history.

12327/9274

Akhromeyev's U.S. Visit

*LD1207193988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1730 GMT 12 Jul 88*

[Text] As we have already reported, the visit of Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy defense minister of the USSR, to the United States has ended. As a result of the visit, it is planned to broaden contacts between representatives of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. Here is what Perilyev, deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists:

[Begin Perilyev recording] This was the first visit of this kind in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations. It was a part of the process of the further development of contacts between the USSR and the United States at various levels.

Contacts in the military sphere assist the broadening of understanding and trust, which can only have a positive effect on the state of relations between our countries and help in overcoming the existing stereotypes. A plan for contacts between Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States for 1988-1990, which envisages a broad program of exchanges of visits by representatives from the armed forces of the two countries, military delegations, and ships, was signed during the visit and will also assist in these goals. U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci will visit the Soviet Union in August. Ministers of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, chiefs of staffs of various U.S. Armed Forces, and Admiral Crowe will then visit our country. The three commanders in chief of the various Armed Forces of the USSR will pay a visit to the United States.

The chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs of the U.S. Armed Forces have made a joint statement on the sides' intention to avoid dangerous military activities and to set up a Soviet-U.S. military working group, with the aim of working out corresponding recommendations to facilitate a reduction of the risk of outbreak of dangerous military incidents. The sides have carried out frank and useful exchanges of views on questions being examined at the talks on nuclear (and) space arms.

Both sides evaluate positively the results of the visit.
[end recording]

U.S. Report Examines Upgrading NATO Forces

*LD0407125988 Moscow TASS in English
1241 GMT 4 Jul 88*

["United States Looks for Ways To Upgrade Arms in Europe"—TASS headline]

[Text] Washington July 4 TASS—The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has circulated a report which examines several possible approaches to the question of

upgrading NATO's armed forces in the light of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty in December 1987. The authors of the document look for ways to make up for arms that are subject to elimination under the INF Treaty through a build-up of conventional arms in Europe.

In particular, the report suggests as a 'quick version' spending 5,000 million dollars to build a 'barrier' along the border of the Federal Republic of Germany. The barrier is to consist of tank traps and other types of obstacles. They may have a positive effect on the balance forces, particularly on the first days of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The authors of the study also examine the possibility of implementing a long-term programme for the modernization of NATO forces: To phase in a larger amount of up-to-date types of weapons or considerably to increase the amount of weapons which are already in service. According to the budget office estimates, such programmes would cost 48,000 million and 41,000 million dollars respectively.

There is yet another version—which, according to the authors of the report, may yield results by the middle of the 1990s—envisages the development and purchase of new types of arms to have a capability to deliver a strike immediately against the second echelon of Warsaw Treaty forces.

The report has it that if such version is practicable at all (it would cost approximately 50,000 million dollars and would be implemented only by the year 2008), it would be the most costly arms modernization programme.

NATO Accused of Stalling Preparations for Conventional Arms Talks

*LD0107230588 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Another meeting within the framework of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO over the preparation of the mandate for future talks on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains region, has taken place in Vienna, Austria. Yuriy Solton has this comment:

I think that already at the current stage the negotiations could have lead to impressive results. Regretfully, this has not happened. In fact, no progress has been achieved. [Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland at 2200 GMT on 1 Jul broadcasts a version of this commentary in which Solton says "In fact, little progress has been achieved."] NATO officials lack the courage and, to my mind, even the desire to adopt a political decision on the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. And these proposals give clear-cut answers to questions

that NATO officials themselves put. They tried to intimidate the public on many occasions in the past and still try to do so today with the Warsaw Treaty Organization's military superiority in Europe. But to say something is one thing and to give facts confirming this is another. There are not such facts, however.

Quite a few figures have been released in the West stating the number of Soviet tanks, planes and servicemen, but these figures are often taken out of thin air. The USSR has proposed, therefore, that in order to establish the truth official information should be exchanged about the armed forces and armaments of the two military and political alliances. On-site inspections could check this information. All they would establish will be the asymmetry, of course. Then an agreement could be reached on removing the disbalance, lowering the level of military confrontation at the same time. And then the sides could get down to a general reduction of the armed forces.

The Soviet Union proposes that the army of each side should be cut down by 500,000 men already at the first stage, and then further reductions can be carried out so that the structure of the armed forces in Europe could assume the purely defensive nature.

And what is the response of NATO representatives? They say neither yes nor no. They propose no variants of their own. The relaxation of military tension in Europe where two 3-million-men strong armies oppose one another, the armies equipped with most modern weapons including nuclear, would tell favorably on the entire world situation. What prevents us from achieving this? I'm sure it is NATO's stake on military force. I'm also convinced that NATO will have to give up this policy sooner or later. The practice of balancing on the brink of a military conflict becomes too dangerous today.

Chervov Cited on NATO Modernization Plans
LD0207131188 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Text] Lately, high-ranking NATO officials have been talking increasingly often about their plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, American General John Galvin, for one called for implementing these plans several days ago in Zurich. What is behind these calls for modernization, and why have the top NATO officials concerned themselves with it? Our reporter addressed this question to Colonel General Nikolay Chervov of the Soviet General Staff.

In other words, modernization means rearmament, General Chervov said. In fact, this involves plans for replacing the missiles to be eliminated under the INF Treaty with other nuclear weapons.

What type of weapons?

Recently American Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, himself spoke about this in a report for the congress. NATO's plans provide for the emergence of another modification of the Lance missile with longer range and greater accuracy. The United States Sixth Fleet, based on the Mediterranean, will receive already next spring its first consignment of the 300 cruise missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory.

There are plans to deploy in West Germany and Britain new planes armed with such cruise missiles, which will be capable of striking targets intended for the Pershing-2's and cruise missiles to be eliminated under the INF Treaty. In short, Gen Chervov went on to say, as a result of implementing the plans for modernization, Europe might come in for bigger arsenals of nuclear weapons after the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles than it has now.

Formally, the weapon systems envisaged by the modernization plans are not covered by the INF Treaty. In fact, however, their goal is to bypass the treaty. That is why the Soviet Union resolutely objects to modernization, the real aim of which is to rearm Europe, General Chervov pointed out.

Markushin on Danish Debate on NATO Nuclear Armed Ships
18010365b Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Markushin: "What NATO Is Dissatisfied With"]

[Text] A tense political situation is developing in Denmark. The prime minister, P. Schluter, has taken a decision to prorogue the Folketing (Parliament) and call early parliamentary elections. In the government statement this step was justified by the complex situation arising in the Parliament as a result of fundamental differences of opinion over nuclear safety policy.

The heart of the matter is as follows. At the end of last week, the Folketing by a majority vote (75 to 58) adopted a resolution introduced by the opposition Social Democratic Party. It stated that the entry of foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons into the nation's ports was incompatible with the principles of the Danish nuclear safety policy. As is known, Denmark along with Norway has banned the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime. Up to the present, however, it has been felt that the observance of this demand by the NATO allies rests on their voluntary compliance.

The resolution proposes to alter the existing practice substantially. Henceforth the commanders of ships calling in Denmark will receive written notification of the ban of nuclear weapons on the ships. In other words, it is a question of refusing to permit in Danish ports the NATO ships which do not confirm the absence of nuclear weapons on board.

Such a change is not to the liking of the NATO members. They view the resolution of the Danish Parliament as a document which can entail "serious consequences" since it, supposedly, will damage military-political collaboration within the bloc. Official London is among the "deeply concerned." There they have already stated that the British Government intends to review its attitude toward the agreements on joint defense, the friendly visits by naval vessels to Danish ports and so forth. In heating up the atmosphere, the English *Daily Telegraph* is frightening readers with the fact that the North Atlantic bloc is confronted with a "hard-to-resolve crisis of confidence, the most acute in the entire history of the Alliance."

Washington has responded even more sharply. The U.S. ambassador to Denmark was not slow in threatening the Danish government in making no bones about "the possibility of applying harsh sanctions." Generally speaking, the American military-political leadership has shown irritation with Denmark which has supposedly not made a sufficient contribution to the defense efforts of the bloc.

Both in Washington and at NATO Headquarters, the results of the voting in the Danish Parliament have been perceived as a "very bad sign" and as a "bad example" which could be contagious for others. Such a harsh response by the senior partners in the North Atlantic bloc forced P. Schluter to assume a stance of decisive defense of NATO nuclear policy. And this response did not even stop short of proroguing the Parliament which put him in power.

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**Survey of NATO Automation of Artillery,
Antitank Weaponry**

18010365b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article, published under the heading "Military Technical Review" by Col (Res) Capt V. Malikov, doctor of technical sciences: "Automation of Guns and Mortars"]

[Text] The strategists of the North Atlantic bloc are intensely searching for ways to "compensate for lost firepower" as a result of the cutback in medium- and short-range missiles, the remaining nuclear weapons are being modernized and a "defense initiative in the area of conventional weapons" is being developed on the basis of modern technology. This, in particular, can be seen from the speeches of certain representatives of the Western military political circles at a session of the NATO Council held recently in Brussels.

The newspaper *Washington Post* on this issue has written that the successes achieved in carrying out "strategic programs" make it possible to move on to the development of automated weapons and other combat vehicles initially with remote control and in the future employing an "artificial intelligence" in the control systems.

It has been announced that from the start of the 1980s, work has intensified on automating the loading processes for medium and large caliber guns. Judging from publications in the foreign press, American designers have focused their efforts on the following main directions: automating the self-propelled artillery guns; developing robot combat vehicles and mobile remote-controlled antitank automatic guns; developing automated materials handling and loading-transport vehicles.

As was pointed out in the magazine *Defense*, definite results have already been made in developing the automatic 75-mm and 90-mm tank cannons and the 155-mm self-propelled cannons. As the energy sources, the automatic loaders are to use the energy of the round (the kinetic energy from the recoil and counterrecoil). Ammunition (shells and propellant charges) is to be located in special magazine drums and rammed into the chambers of the gun barrels by special devices having a varying drive (accumulating the energy of the recoil): hydropneumatic, hydraulic and electrohydraulic. Over the long run for placing shells in the gun loading tray they propose using manipulator robots with four or six degrees of freedom.

Why precisely have they started the automating of cannons from the antitank weapons? Foreign military specialists explain this by the appearance of improved armor which is not pierced by the small- and medium-caliber shaped charge shells and this has necessitated the development of rapid fire medium-caliber cannons. American military specialists assume that an increase in the kill probability for the tanks and other armored equipment can be achieved primarily by firing in bursts or "sprays" of several shells. This effect can be achieved by automation, for "man," as they feel, in a complex control system is the most undependable and slow-acting transfer link.

In part this idea was already embodied in the plans for the 75-mm automatic antitank cannon developed in the United States by the Ares firm. The gun is remote-controlled and has a rate of fire of 60 rounds a minute. It is assumed that it will be introduced in the units and subunits of the Rapid Deployment Forces.

For vertical and horizontal laying they have provided a power drive (laying speed 60 degrees a second). The design of the drive mechanisms and the arrangement of the rocker unit of the gun provide circular and angles of fire of from -10 to +55 degrees. The drum-type magazine (it holds 6 unitary rounds) and the combined feed-ram are located in the barrel jacket on the right side

of the gun. Reloading is carried out through a hatch in the magazine wall. In the future they plan to increase the capacity of the magazine to 40 rounds.

The gun remote control board has a television camera and monitor. In subsequent models they plan to install an additional television camera. The gun crew functions, as the magazine *Defense* points out, come down merely to reloading while all the rest of the time it is far off from the cannon in a shelter.

With a 6-round magazine the cannon weighs 2,300 kg. The system is air-transportable and can be carried by the UN-60 Blackhawk helicopters.

The foreign press has pointed out that the "Aries" firm has begun to design an automatic 90-caliber antitank cannon which in design terms is analogous to the RCAAS.

Automatic antitank cannons are found not only in the U.S. Army. Sweden employs a 155-mm self-propelled cannon VK55/50 developed by the "Bofors" firm. It is equipped with an automatic loading system which provides a rate of fire up to 15 rounds a minute (14 rounds in the magazine and 1 in the barrel chamber. The magazine consists of 7 inclined hoppers for two rounds each and is loaded in with the aid of a transport-loader device without the crew leaving the vehicle.

The cannon can fire automatically as well as by individual rounds. For providing ammunition at the firing position the self-propelled gun can tow a trailer with 64 rounds. Moreover, the transport-loader vehicle can be attached to the cannon and this can carry 42 rounds.

The maximum range of fire for a HE fragmentation shell with a muzzle velocity of 865 meters a second is 25 km and in employing a rocket-assisted shell exceeds 30 km. The weight of the gun in firing position is 53 tons.

The foreign press has also announced that on the basis of the second and third generation main tanks the European capitalist states have begun developing more advanced self-propelled guns with automatic loading and firing processes. According to the information of the magazine *Newsweek*, the United States is developing on a competitive basis a 155-mm self-propelled howitzer with automatic loading and improved armored protection. According to the specifications set by the U.S. Department of Defense, the gun's unit of fire should be at least 40 rounds and the rate of fire 10-12 rounds a minute. In the weapons system they plan to use armored transport-loader vehicles.

At the HEL Laboratory of the U.S. Army, they have developed a demonstration model of a 155-mm self-propelled howitzer which makes it possible to conduct research on increasing the effective employment of the weapon and automating the operating processes as well

as for reducing the size of the crew. The press has also announced that the United States is developing an experimental model of a 155-mm remote controlled howitzer.

There are also plans for automatic self-propelled guns which, instead of traditional powders, use liquid metal substances. As foreign military experts assert, these make it possible to double or triple the unit of fire, to increase barrel durability, to reduce the cost of a round and significantly facilitate the automating of the loading processes. A version of the overall layout for such a 155-mm gun with two drum-type magazines (the proposed total unit of fire is 126 rounds) is shown in Figure 3 [not reproduced].

The idea of automating and increasing the rate of fire, foreign military observers point out, more and more has taken over the Western mortar designers. Thus, specialists from the West German Diehl firm, upon orders from the West German Defense Ministry, have conducted research on the possibilities of increasing combat effectiveness of mortar weapons and, in particular, the 120-mm self-propelled mortars which are in use under the TOE in the motorized infantry battalions of the ground troops. The press has announced in the process of the research, in addition to the measures of increasing armor defense, particular attention has been paid to providing a high rate of fire by using automatic loaders and automating the processes of laying and fire control.

The Diehl firm, the journal *Wehrtechnik* has stated, has developed an experimental model for a future 120-mm self-propelled automatic mortar and has conducted range testing of it. The gun is breech-loaded. The design of the rotating magazine makes it possible to maintain a rate of fire of 6 rounds in 10 seconds.

In the aim of increasing the speed of the mortar fire control process, specialists from the firm are developing target designation equipment with built-in laser range finders and infrared imagers as well as digital command transceivers linked to the mortar's ballistic computer.

In analyzing the conducted testing, representatives of the firm assert that even now it is completely feasible to develop for mass production a self-propelled automatic mortar equipped with target designation devices, an on-board topographic surveyor, digital radio communications, a ballistic computer, an automatic guidance system and automatic loader. Such a mortar, it is the opinion of the experts, will be capable of hitting not only area targets but also point ones such as tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment.

Izvestiya Reaction to Publication of 1988 'Soviet Military Power'

18010365c Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Apr 88 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Made in the Pentagon"]

[Text] [Introductory headline] Washington, 29 April [1988]. The TASS correspondent O. Polyakovskiy has reported that the Pentagon published its regular annual "Soviet Military Power," having provided it this time with the subtitle "Assessment of the Threat." This is not the only difference of the seventh annual from the six previous ones. [End of introductory headline]

These differences, alas, are not that the Pentagon has suddenly forsaken the vocabulary of cold war times or the unsubstantiated accusations against the USSR of "aggressiveness," "militarism," "imperialism" or a drive for "world domination" and so forth. There is more than enough of this in the seventh opus of the U.S. Defense Department. This time the Pentagon has decided to "analyze" how restructuring, glasnost and the new thinking have been felt in soviet foreign and military policy. In the opinion of the Pentagon theorists, it has not done so at all. All of this, the annual states, is a "change in style" by which "Moscow is endeavoring to divert attention from military and adventurism in foreign policy."

One other distinction from the six previous "works" by the Pentagon is that this time they have tried to put a so-to-speak "historical philosophical" base under the exercise in black propaganda. This appears as follows: "Russian civilization has not imbibed such fundamental Western concepts as constitutionality, democratic rule, the rights of man or a free market."

The demogogic theorizing, as always, is richly provided with colored graphs, diagrams and maps which intimidate the reader with the "lag" in virtually all U.S. parameters behind the USSR and NATO behind the Warsaw Pact. The map of the "military operations in Eurasia" supposedly planned by the Soviet Union has been drawn in in a particularly alarming manner. Red and black arrows of military strikes spread in all directions from Soviet territory. They hang over Scandinavia,

West Germany, France, Spain, Britain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Japan and even Alaska which has no relation to Eurasia. "Although the Soviet Union might propose using only conventional armed forces in a conflict, it is ready to employ nuclear and chemical weapons," states the chapter illustrated by this map.

"As before we are hoping for substantial changes in the Soviet Union in the direction of less aggressive and less dangerous policy, but up to the present, we do not see evidence that the Soviet Union is altering the offensive nature of the structure or deployment of its Armed Forces," states the U.S. secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci, in the foreword to the annual publication.

The fanning of the myth of the Soviet military threat is a traditional strategem in American policy, particularly during the budget season. Budgetary considerations can be clearly seen in the current collection. It states directly that "the trend which began in 1985 to reduce allocations for defense against the background of such a significant strengthening of Soviet military might which this report discloses... can have potentially disastrous consequences."

As improbable as it seems but it is a fact that the compilation of the annual was in no way influenced neither by the December meeting in Washington of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, with President R. Reagan, nor the concluding of the Treaty to Eliminate Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles (according to the annual, this merely "emphasizes the dangerous trends in the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces"), nor the work on an agreement to reduce the strategic arsenals of the two countries, nor the constant meeting of their ministers of foreign affairs, nor the approach of the Moscow Summit.

The seventh annual is still the same exercises in disinformation, the distorting of facts and outright lies which were resorted to on the banks of the Potomac during the time when the U.S. President called the USSR an "evil empire." But such a publication cannot bring Soviet-American relations anything but harm.

Chief Political Officer Recalls Achievements of Limited Contingent

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21 May 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj Gen A. Zakharov, chief, political department, limited contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: "Heroes and Heroic Deeds"]

[Text] He who has given warmth will live eternally, they say in the East. Today, when the world's attention is fixed upon Afghanistan, and the events associated with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, this Eastern wisdom takes on special meaning for us.

Soviet forces went to Afghanistan at the request of its lawful government, with honorable and noble goals. We understood that harsh tests awaited us. We fulfilled the order of the homeland, and faith in the great cause of assisting a friendly people strengthened us in all our trials. A feeling of sympathy toward the unfortunate in the internecine war of the people did not leave the soldiers, even in those tragic minutes when their military comrades perished under the fire of the extremists. The Afghan people and their suffering were and remain our pain and our hope. Here remain the adopted brothers of almost all of our soldiers and officers, because they accomplished tasks both of war and of peace arm in arm, shoulder to shoulder.

It is not, as we say, customary to keep count of good that has been done. But, in these remarks I would like to buttress my thesis with documentation. Today it is obviously far from complete. And it will be entirely lost by the day of the total withdrawal of our forces. However, much can already be understood from these figures.

Before me is an official report for 15 May 1988.

Soviet forces, during the time of their stay on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan repaired, renovated or built anew: 84 schools and lycees; 25 hospitals; 26 kindergartens; 326 residential homes; 35 mosques; 48 wells; 53 bridges; 43 Afghan-Soviet friendship rooms; 4 diesel electric power stations; drilled 41 wells; provided electricity for 6 villages; dug and restored 117 km of irrigation ditches and canals.

It is necessary to take into account that the work took place constantly under aimed fire. Just built or restored objects were set on fire or utterly destroyed. And it was necessary to begin again.

Our soldiers lay 32 avenues of friendship. In the rocky, poor soil, abundantly covered by sweat and blood, this spring trees of our hope took root and colored the land. On the trunks of many of them remain sorrowful tablets with the names of our sons who paid with their lives for future springs and human happiness, which, one hopes to believe, will undoubtedly take its permanent and reliable place here.

However, the official report does not end with this. And I am truly happy that I can continue the inexhaustible listing: The Soviet people came and are leaving as brothers, generously sharing warmth. In 1987 alone, medical aid was given to 100,200 citizens of the country. The figures are constantly being made more precise, because, as it turned out, in the first years none of our military doctors or aid men kept track of whom they assisted or under what circumstances. Aid was simply given to children and old people, women and wounded Afghan troops, at deadly risk to themselves. I intentionally am not naming names here, the feat of military medical personnel is of a special scale, and it would be necessary to name each, since rarely, and apparently never in all these years, was there one who would not share his blood with the wounded. And not only once. It is necessary to understand this and transfer it from the professional category into the political. Only Soviet medics, people of our social school, are capable of such a massive manifestation of selflessness and self-sacrifice.

Sixty patients per day is the norm for members of the population here received by military medical personnel. All of those requiring it were provided medicines.

And further, from March through 11 May 1988 (for 15 May there is not yet information) goods and products in the amount of 3,404,151 rubles were distributed to the local population in 340 populated areas. There were 33,408 families encompassed. And this amounted to (here it is also precisely counted) 210,808 people.

The Soviet people, who have experienced war, understand well what a loaf of bread, a pot of stewed meat, or a bowl of groats means to a family emaciated by long hunger. This is life. And it, this hunk of bread, like unexpected happiness, is never forgotten.

Internationalism is strong in that it links people, unites and elevates them. And charity, sympathy and mutual assistance links them. No matter how difficult it was for the Soviet military subunits who were carrying out one or another combat mission, if a call for help rang out all available forces immediately rushed to the aid of the Afghan soldiers. Here I also wish to avoid names, because it would be necessary to name too many of our soldiers and officers. Let their friends whom they supported in combat, and taught how to handle weapons and equipment, talk about this; those with whom they shared their last bullet or grenade.

The Afghan army soldiers are courageous people. They are reliable in combat. And they are very capable students, with character. So I believe that the examples of heroism our people displayed before their eyes in fulfilling their military international duty, will leave their mark.

Here in Afghanistan we confronted a striking situation.

Often criticizing young people for a lack of purposefulness, and for recklessness and impetuosity in their tastes and views, we here saw with our own eyes and felt with every nerve how profound is the historical memory in our young people. World War II soldiers can be proud of their grandsons—a glorious generation has taken their place. They are people of high spirit, who are proud and courageous. I will cite only one parallel.

There is a document from the period of the Battle of Stalingrad that is widely known among the people. It is a protocol from a komsomol meeting in one rifle company. It has gone down in all of the reading books on the Great Patriotic War.

I recall the content of the protocol.

"We listened to a discussion of the conduct of komsomol members in combat.

"We resolved: It is better to die in the foxhole, but not to withdraw in shame.

"Question to the front line soldier: Are there valid reasons for leaving a firing position?

"Answer: Out of all reasons given in justification, only one will be taken into account—death."

So. Next to this protocol, one January day this year the following political report lay on my table: "7 January 88. On Hill 3234, where positions of airborne troops under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Tkachev and Yu. Gagarin were disposed, the rebels opened massed fire from rocket launchers and mortars. The shelling continued for 40 minutes. Under its cover armed groups dressed in black uniforms rushed into the attack from two sides. First to open fire against them were machinegunners on the flanks—Gds Pvt A. Melnikov and Gds Jr Sgt V. Aleksandrov. The rebels reeled back. But soon a second attack began. A desperate attempt was made to envelop the hill from three sides. This did not succeed as a result of the actions by the platoon commanded by Gds Sr Lt S. Ryzhkov, which came to the aid of the paratroopers. An hour and 10 minutes later a third attack began; this was the most fierce. And again staunchness, and special courage and valor were displayed by the machinegunners of komsomol members Melnikov and Aleksandrov. Changing positions, they shelled the hard pressing enemies at point blank range. Repeatedly they called in fire on themselves.

When the third attack was beaten back a brief komsomol meeting was held on Hill 3234. The paratroopers swore an oath to their dead and wounded comrades that they would not give up the hill, but would fight to the last bullet. The komsomol oath was transmitted by the radio station to the unit command post in open text..."

Here is such a document for our day. Such amazing strength of spirit in our lads, and such a profound historical memory! Our country, and all mothers who sons traversed the difficult roads of Afghanistan, can be proud of their sons.

"Everyone at the command post who heard this oath of the komsomol members could not hold back tears," Gds Lt Col V. Vostrotin, airborne unit commander, told me the next day. "On this anxious night another six rebel attacks were beaten back on Hill 3234. The battle lasted for seven hours. I will say more. Many hills along the road to Khost know the unparalleled courage of Soviet soldiers, who gave their lives in the name of the future Afghan people.

It is said not without reason that each individual is a special world. That is why the loss of each is so painful and irreplaceable, painful and sacred, as he fell fulfilling his duty. All of us here, from private to general, received with deep understanding the Appeal of the Party Central Committee to the Soviet soldier-internationalist. Returning to the homeland, you truly feel bright feelings of the consciousness of your necessity and correctness in the noble cause of assisting a friendly people, and strengthening the ideals of internationalism in the world's public consciousness. In our multi-national people, I consider readiness to come to the aid to be a most vivid trait, and still to come not sparing oneself in saving another. That is what I constantly think about as I recall those numerous meetings with soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers on hilltop outposts, during combat operations, during column escorting missions, in hospitals.

I saw the young people of our country in all of their manifestations—in the most difficult combat reality, at times in hopeless situations; at rest and hard at work. When steel cables could not withstand the tension, the muscles and nerves of our lads withstood it. They proved worthy in all situations.

Yes, they perished. Yes, they received wounds and mutilations. All of this happened. This is war, and it is merciless to every living thing. But, the spirit of the Soviet soldier, the soldier-internationalist, was undefeatable.

At one time the propagandists circulated the popular phrase, "ideals are our wings." Here it received a more profound additional meaning: "ideals are our immortality."

To some it may seem a pretentious phrase, in an old lexicon. But, to me, as it applies to events in Afghanistan, it appears very accurate. You see, we were not merely helping a friendly people, by our attitude toward our international duty, we showed in action invincible fidelity to the ideals of socialism.

On Afghan soil we were always on the front line of ideological confrontation, where the density of anti-Soviet fire, carried out by Western propaganda centers, and the Afghan counterrevolution, at times was no less than the density of real fire. Transmissions in various languages of the peoples of the USSR by hostile radio announcers holed up in Pakistan reach even to the disposition of our garrisons, guard posts and positions—it is necessary to state this frankly. But, the enemy suffered total defeat in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the people.

Considerable time has already passed, but even now I remember down to the slightest details my first flight into the guard posts standing guard over the "Afghan road of life," as the route running from the Soviet Union through the Salang Pass to Kabul is called here. One of the posts is called Edelweiss, because it is located at a height of more than 4,000 meters. Everything needed, products, water, ammunition, is delivered here by helicopters. It is not even easy to live here. Burning wind, and intolerable heat. And our people live here for several months. Moreover, they guard the road, and frequently enter into battle with armed groups of the opposition. One wonders from where people weary from the high altitude, and cut off from the outside world would get courage and valor here? And only privates, with Jr Sgt R. Kusayev, serve on this position. But, such is the valor of our young people that they are able to display high military and moral qualities.

Here are several examples from my memory; this has already become also part of my propaganda arsenal.

Three soldiers, led by Private N. Khudnazarov got into a carefully camouflaged dushman minefield. Khudnazarov, walking in front, stepped on a mine and was seriously wounded. However, he did not allow his comrades, privates F. Kharipov and Sh. Kurbanov to come to him. He crawled away himself, bleeding profusely, from the mined sector.

Or another example. An armed group of rebels fell upon a column of Soviet and Afghan vehicles near the Salang Pass. The reserve group of an outpost commanded by Sr Lt V. Kiselev entered the unequal clash with superior enemy forces. The motorized riflemen struck the attackers from the rear. They took all the fire on themselves. The column of loaded vehicles succeeded in getting out from under enemy fire. But Officer Kiselev perished in battle. Posthumously he was awarded the highest order of the homeland, the Order of Lenin. The hero is not among the living, but his feat lives, and teaches courage. It was the feat of a communist.

We note justly that the formation of an individual begins in the family, the school, and the labor collective. This is natural. Love for the homeland is not only transmitted from generation to generation, it is also inculcated. It is inculcated by the entire system of military-patriotic and ideological-moral work that has taken shape in one or

another region, republic, oblast or city. And I can assert with complete assurance that in those places where party and komsomol organizations have an attitude of deep understanding toward this task, where patriotic clubs have been created and are operating actively, and where veterans' soviets, military commissariats, and DOSAAF schools are functioning substantively, it is namely from there that such lads come into the army. This is true both physically and morally—with a developed feeling of their international and patriotic duty.

Recently I received my latest "portion" of mail toward which I take a special interest. These letters from the homeland are like a barometer of public attention to the problems of Afghanistan, and its subsequent destiny. There are many letters from school children, entire Pioneer detachments and teams, and from labor collectives. They ask for the addresses of soldier-internationalists from among their kin, in order to express their gratitude for their great feat, and to take part in the fate of those who received wounds and mutilations. Natasha Chmyreva, from the village of Yubileynoye in the Voroshilovgrad region, sent letters on behalf of seventh grade pupils; a six grade detachment soviet from the Kerch 23d Secondary School; fourth grade students from the Popovka Village Secondary School in Primorskiy Kray, and many others sent letters. They were touching letters about their concern and tenderness. But, today I as a political officer am concerned about something else, about the considerable callousness and inattention to the fate of reserve soldiers who served on Afghan soil. Great Patriotic War veteran Arkadiy Vasilyevich Ivanov of Odessa wrote me with sorrow about his neighbor, Reserve Sr Sgt S. Sorochinskiy, who was wounded in Afghanistan in 1984. He has been in hospitals twice already. Now his health has recovered. He married and has a son. However, the Baltskiy Rayon Ispolkom has still not helped the young family of the soldier-internationalist with housing. They are forced to wander from one private apartment to another, and pay more money. We recently sent to the appropriate department in Odessa letters requesting they assist the wounded reserve soldier, and look into Sorochinskiy's needs and concerns. But we received no answer. And there are numerous such examples. Although there are also undoubtedly numerous examples of another sort. Today, according to our information, in 15 cities and villages there are streets bearing the names of soldier-internationalists, and more than 200 pioneer teams bear the names of heroes of the Soviet Union who earned this title while fulfilling their international duty. This is very good. But, we will agree that this is insignificantly small to assess rightly the high spirituality of Soviet young people in the late 20th Century, and their loyalty to Leninist ideals, patriotism and courage, and fidelity to their military duty. This is insignificantly small to raise to a qualitatively new level military-patriotic work with the rising generation.

We are sure that the soldier-internationalists who fulfilled their duty honorably and courageously will fulfill new tasks just as selflessly. And it is necessary to do

everything so that their energy serves well restructuring, the renewal of socialism, and the protection of its gains.

Recently a memorial of the combat brotherhood of Soviet and Afghan soldiers was ceremoniously opened in Kabul. Flowers were laid by its marble slab and set at the foot. On the slab were engraved in Russian and Dari the names of the heroes of the Soviet Union and the heroes of the Republic of Afghanistan, who perished in battles against the forces of the armed opposition for a bright future for the Afghan people. There were 17 names of

our Soviet lads; 17 sons of our multi-national homeland. This is one in every four of those who earned the heroic title for a feat accomplished on the soil of the fraternal country. It is, of course, few—only 17. We in the homeland must know each name, and know and remember each one who perished by name. The living will recount themselves. They require only our attention. And our warmth when we meet them.

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